Product Market Competition and Corporate Mergers and Acquisitions by Liu, Yen-Chih
Old Dominion University
ODU Digital Commons
Theses and Dissertations in Business
Administration College of Business (Strome)
Spring 2009
Product Market Competition and Corporate
Mergers and Acquisitions
Yen-Chih Liu
Old Dominion University
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.odu.edu/businessadministration_etds
Part of the Business Administration, Management, and Operations Commons, and the Finance
and Financial Management Commons
This Dissertation is brought to you for free and open access by the College of Business (Strome) at ODU Digital Commons. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Theses and Dissertations in Business Administration by an authorized administrator of ODU Digital Commons. For more information,
please contact digitalcommons@odu.edu.
Recommended Citation
Liu, Yen-Chih. "Product Market Competition and Corporate Mergers and Acquisitions" (2009). Doctor of Philosophy (PhD),
dissertation, , Old Dominion University, DOI: 10.25777/8am1-dm61
https://digitalcommons.odu.edu/businessadministration_etds/44
PRODUCT MARKET COMPETITION AND CORPORATE 
MERGERS AND ACQUISITIONS 
by 
Yen-Chih Liu 
B.A. June 1997, National Taiwan Ocean University 
M.B.A. December 2002, Old Dominion University 
A Dissertation Submitted to the Faculty of 
Old Dominion University in Partial Fulfillment of the 
Requirement for the Degree of 
DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY 
BUSINESS ADMINISTRATION - FINANCE 
OLD DOMINION UNIVERSITY 
May 2009 
Approved by: 
-Kenneth Yung (Director)
Mohammad Najand (Member) 
David Selover (Member) 
Abstract 
PRODUCT MARKET COMPETITION AND CORPORATE MERGERS 
AND ACQUISITIONS 
Yen-Chih Liu 
Old Dominion University, 2009 
Director: Dr. Kenneth Yung 
Conventional models assume competition improves corporate efficiency as firms 
strive to outperform competitors. In the context of agency models, the link between 
competition and managerial behavior becomes fuzzy. Hart (1983) and Schmidt (1997) 
posit that competition reduces managerial slack. Scharfstein (1988) argues that 
competition might increase managerial shirking. Recent studies on the relation between 
managerial compensation and competition further document conflicting evidence. In this 
study, I examine the effect of product market competition on corporate mergers and 
acquisitions. My initial results suggest that the definition of competition is critical in 
evaluating corporate mergers and acquisitions. Using three new dimensions (product 
substitutability, market density, and entry cost) to measure competition, I find the 
manager's M&A decisions could have different implications across the three dimensions. 
Regarding acquisition premium, my results consistently show a negative relation between 
competition and the size of the premium. 
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Chapter 1 
Introduction 
According to Adam Smith, monopoly is a great enemy to good management (1976, 
bk. 1, chap. 1 1, p. 165; cited in Armstrong et al [1994]). In other words, competition is a 
good thing. It is generally believed that a competitive economy allocates resources more 
efficiently. It is also a common belief that competition results in downward pressure on 
costs, decreases slack, provides incentives for the efficient organization of production, 
and even promotes innovation. In competitive markets, inefficient firms must either 
become efficient or exit, whereas in markets where potential competitors are driven away 
by insurmountable barriers of entry, monopolists can survive even if inefficient. 
The effect of competition could be multi-dimensional. A review of the literature 
suggests that competition could affect innovation, productivity, productivity growth, and 
technical efficiency. Given the multi-dimensional impacts of competition, many 
researchers suggest that the effect of competition is theoretically ambiguous and not 
supported by unanimous empirical evidence (Aghion and Howitt, 1992; Grossman and 
Helpman, 1991; Nickell, 1992 and 1996). Schumpeter (1943), for example, has argued 
that competition could have negative effects because it prevents firms from accumulating 
rents that can be used for research and development. Lowering the innovation rate also 
lowers the rate of long-run growth. For firms without retained earnings, competition may 
deter restructuring and improvements in efficiency by lowering profits. Furthermore, 
corporate restructurings induced by competition frequently involve downsizing. In these 
restructurings, operation efficiency may become lower as firms are forced to excessively 
reduce their use of labor and capital. For empirical evidence, Nickell (1996) examines the 
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productivity performance of a large number of U.K. manufacturing companies and 
concludes that the there is not overwhelming empirical evidence that competition 
improves firm productivity. Nickell et al. (1992) find that firms with high market share 
appear to have higher productivity growth. Similar competition effects on the level of 
productivity are confirmed by Haskel (1990) and Hay and Liu (1994). On the contrary, 
Van Wijnbergen and Venables (1993) find that the trade liberalization and deregulation 
undertaken by Mexico during 1986-88 resulted in an increase in competition and a 
significant increase in productivity growth. Geroski (1990) find evidence that 
concentration and other measures of monopoly power tend to reduce the rate of 
innovation and, hence, productivity growth. Caves and Barton (1990), and Caves et al. 
(1992) find that an increase in market concentration above a certain threshold tends to 
reduce technical efficiency. 
To sum up, the extant literature has reported substantial conflicting empirical 
evidence as well as contradictory theoretical expositions regarding the effect of 
competition. 
1.1 The Relevance of Agency Theory 
Competition exists in factor and product markets. In this dissertation, I focus on the 
relation between production market competition (PMC) and the behavior of the firm. It is 
beyond doubt that competition has an impact on efficiency and growth. However, a 
critical link that needs to be considered is the human factor involved. That is, how do 
corporate managers behave in response to competition in the market place? If the 
manager is also the owner of the firm, then the (positive and negative) effects of 
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competition would likely be as straightforward as those predicted by conventional 
economic models which typically assume the owner-manager paradigm. However, it is 
commonly known that managers are merely agents whose interests may be different from 
those of the firm since the advent of separation of ownership and control (Berle and 
Means, 1932). That is, the manager is not necessarily the same as the firm if the manager 
does not have equity ownership of the company. To study the behavior of the firm in a 
competitive environment, we therefore need a better understanding of the behavior of the 
manager. In finance literature, agency theory has offered theoretical explanations as well 
as empirically testable implications regarding managerial behavior. According to agency 
theory, the firm is viewed as a set of contracts between firm owners and employees, with 
each entity motivated by its self-interest. Managers are agents hired with contractual 
obligations to promote the interest of the firm owners. But agency theory suggests that 
managers may act in a way that protects their personal benefits more than enhancing the 
financial well-being of the firm. Thus, I intend to study the relation between product 
market competition and managerial behavior in the context of agency theory. 
Agency theory has been used in finance literature to examine and explain the 
behavior of corporate managers. Three articles have been particularly influential. Jensen 
and Meckling (1976) explored the ownership structure of the corporation, including how 
equity ownership by managers aligns managers' interests with those of owners. Fama 
(1980) discussed the role of efficient capital and labor markets as information 
mechanisms that are used to control the self-serving behavior of top executives. Fama 
and Jensen (1983) described the role of the board of directors as an information system 
that the stockholders within large corporations could use to monitor the opportunism of 
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top executives. A common theme in these studies is the opportunistic or self-serving 
behaviors of corporate managers. One of the earliest studies of this type was conducted 
by Amihud and Lev (1981). In their study, Amihud and Lev explored why firms engage 
in conglomerate mergers. The general understanding in finance is that conglomerate 
mergers are not in the interests of the stockholders because stockholders can diversify 
directly through their stock portfolio. Conglomerate mergers represent a duplication of 
the effort as well as a waste of corporate resources. Amihud and Lev posited that 
conglomerate mergers may be attractive to managers who have fewer avenues available 
to diversify their own risk. Hence, these authors linked merger and diversification 
activities to the self-serving behavior of the firm manager. Exploring similar corporate 
events, Walking and Long (1984) studied managers' resistance to takeover bids. Their 
sample included 105 large U.S. corporations that were targets of takeover attempts 
between 1972 and 1977. Financial economists consider that resistance to takeover bids 
is not in the stockholders' interests, but it may be in the interests of managers because 
they can lose their jobs during a takeover. Consistent with the general predictions of 
agency theory, Walking and Long found that managers who have substantial equity 
positions within their firms were less likely to resist takeover bids. Kosnik (1987) 
examined another example of managerial opportunism. She examined 110 large U. S. 
corporations that were greenmail targets between 1979 and 1983. She related the 
characteristics of the board of directors to whether greenmail was actually paid (paying 
greenmail is considered not in the stockholders' interests). Consistent with the predictions 
of agency theory, Kosnik found that boards of companies that resisted greenmail had a 
higher proportion of outside board directors. Jensen (1986) examined the agency 
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problems associated with free cash flow of corporations. His findings reinforce the 
conclusions of other researchers. Free cash flow is cash flow in excess of that required to 
fund all projects that have positive net present values when discounted at the relevant cost 
of capital. Conflicts of interest between shareholders and managers over payout policies 
are especially severe when the firm has substantial free cash flow. The problem is how to 
motivate managers to disgorge the cash rather than investing it at below the cost of 
capital or wasting it on inefficient activities. As explained by Jensen, agency theory 
offers insights into why firm managers would expend free cash flow on takeovers and 
diversifications that are not beneficial to the shareholders. Managers extract personal 
benefits when executive compensation (perquisites consumption) is tied to firm size or 
when the firm becomes more dependent on the manager as acquisitions increase the firm 
size. Such low-profit mergers are more likely in industries with large cash flows but have 
few growth opportunities. 
In sum, there is significant evidence in finance literature supporting the predictions of 
agency theory that managerial behavior is frequently associated with promoting the 
self-interest of managers rather than the welfare of shareholders. It is based on these 
findings that I examine the effect of product market competition on managerial behavior. 
1.2 Competition and Ethics 
The literature on the effect of competition has provided differing opinions regarding 
how managers behave in competitive environments. Shleifer (2004) links corporate 
managerial behavior with competition. However, he focuses on ethics instead of 
efficiency. The study of Shleifer suggests that in the short run competition may lead to 
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unethical managerial behavior; despite he is optimistic that in the long run competition 
will improve efficiency sufficiently that ethical behavior would be promoted in society. 
Building on the ideas in Gary Becker's (1957) classic study of discrimination, Shleifer 
finds a broad range of circumstances where competition promotes censured conduct. He 
examined several types of ethically questionable corporate behavior. 
On the issue of child labor, Shleifer points out that competition brings children into 
the labor force. A firm would hire children if it is cheaper than hiring adults (even taking 
into account differences in productivity). The firm hiring children can reduce prices; its 
competitors must then hire children also, or be driven out of business. On the supply 
side, families also compete to send their children to work if doing so elevate their 
positions to compete for food or status. Either of these two forces of competition would 
bring children into the labor force. 
On corruption, Shleifer explains that a firm facing competition has incentives to bribe 
if it can reduce costs and pass on the savings to customers. In a competitive market, then, 
every firm must itself pay bribes or go out of business. In such an environment, 
competition has a positive correlation with the pervasiveness of corruption. Moreover, 
competition for government jobs also intensifies corruption. In some countries, positions 
allowing extensive bribe collection are auctioned off by senior officials. The officials 
who get the jobs are the ones who can collect the most bribes. 
On executive compensation, Shleifer posits that competition for executives is partly 
responsible for the gigantic remuneration paid to executive in recent years. He argues that 
in a market that is less than efficient, managers who possess a superior ability to create or 
sustain a bubble in the value of company stock reduce the firm's cost of equity capital. 
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For these managers, their compensation is determined by the competition among firms 
for this service. Companies will pay for the services of such managers even though the 
executives may have nothing to improve the profitability of the firm. 
On earnings management, Shleifer also points to the impact of competition on 
aggressive corporate accounting practices. According to Shleifer, if earnings 
manipulation helps sustain a high level of stock valuation, it reduces the cost of capital, 
enabling companies to make acquisitions for stock, to attract better executives and 
workers with stock options, and even to issue new shares. There is strong incentive to 
manipulate reported earnings because for some companies, this involves the firm's 
survival in a competitive environment. Without using creative accounting, some firms 
may find their cost of capital too high for them to survive. Even for mature firms, there is 
incentive to manage earnings so that a high equity valuation could alleviate the 
probability of being acquired by a corporate raider. 
In short, Shleifer (2004) suggests that competition could lead to managerial behavior 
that might be ethically questionable. 
1.3 Competition and Managerial Incentives 
To understand the link between competition and managerial behavior, researchers 
have also investigated how competition affects managerial incentives. However, 
researchers have conflicting predictions regarding the effect of competition on 
managerial effort. 
1.3.1 Competition Reduces Managerial Slack 
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Hart (1983) introduces a model of managerial incentives that shows how competition 
between firms may promote managerial incentives. Specifically, Hart considers an 
economic environment where firms are subject to agency problems due to the 
non-observability of managerial effort and managerial performance (managers can 
manipulate earnings). When profits or other measures of performance are not observable, 
monetary incentive schemes are no longer feasible to motivate managers. As managers 
do not respond well to monetary incentives, managers are likely to slack. According to 
Hart, product market competition provides a solution to the problem because competition 
provides more information about the market and the information enhances performance 
evaluation of the manager. At the same time, managers would be concerned about their 
job security if competition causes the firm to go bankrupt. Thus, an increase in 
competition leads to less slack on the part of the manager. Therefore competition acts as 
an incentive scheme to ensure that managers do not buy themselves a 'quiet life'. Along 
similar lines of research, Holmstrom (1982) and Nalebuff and Stiglitz (1983) analyze the 
use of relative performance evaluation. If the number of competitors in a market 
increases, and if the shocks affecting each firm's costs are correlated, then an increase in 
competition generates additional information which can be used to mitigate moral hazard 
problems. Therefore competition improves incentives. Schmidt (1997) also acknowledges 
that competition may increase an inefficient firm's likelihood of going bankrupt, thus, 
exerting pressure on the firm manager to work harder. 
1.3.2 Competition Increases Managerial Slack 
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Scharfstein (1988) suggests that the conclusion of Hart could reverse if managers are 
highly responsive to monetary incentives. That is, competition increases managerial 
shirking when a manager's marginal utility from income is strictly positive. Martin 
(1993) and Horn, Lang, and Lundgren (1994) also find that increased competition is 
associated with reduced managerial effort. Despite Schmidt(1997) suggests that an 
increase in competition might increase managerial incentives, he also points out that a 
decrease in profits and market share due to competition may discourage managers to 
work harder if they feel the extra efforts to reduce costs is no longer justifiable. Hermalin 
(1992) also finds the effect of competition on managerial effort ambiguous. He suggests 
that the effects of competition on managerial behavior can be decomposed into four 
component effects, and each of the components has an ambiguous sign. Specifically, 
Hermalin identifies four mechanisms of the influence of product market competition on 
management performance. These are an income effect of reduced profits in a more 
competitive environment, a risk-adjustment effect if profit risks vary with the degree of 
competition, an effect of change in returns to managerial effort, and the effect of 
improved information in the presence of more rival firms. Managerial shirking increases 
in some cases when the four effects interact. For example, a more informative 
information structure reduces the risk to which the executive must expose himself to 
commit credibly to a given action. According to Hermalin, this is equivalent to increasing 
the executive's income. Since agency goods are normal goods, there is a tendency for the 
executive to consume more agency goods. Recently, Karuna (2007) provides empirical 
evidence that there is a positive relation between managerial compensation and 
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competition. That is, managers must be paid more to work harder in a competitive 
environment. The result of Karuna implies that competition increases managerial slack. 
So far, the literature review has suggested that competition may or may not improve 
efficiency (innovation, growth, productivity, technical efficiency). In addition, the 
literature also is filled with conflicting predictions regarding how managers will behave 
in a competitive environment. Researchers have provided no clear visions as whether 
managers will work harder or less hard in face of competition. Similarly, we are left with 
an unclear picture if competition promotes or decreases ethically questionable managerial 
behavior. To avoid being drowned in such a vast literature of conflicting opinions and 
empirical findings, I use a dichotomous approach that largely categorizes the effects of 
competition into two groups. The first group includes effects that are positive. That is, 
competition improves innovation, productivity, efficiency, and enhances managerial 
effort. The second group includes effects of competition that are negative. That is, 
competition decreases innovation, efficiency, productivity, and promotes managerial 
shirking. It is based on such a premise that I investigate the effect of product market 
competition on managerial behavior. Specifically, I use corporate mergers and 
acquisitions as the events for investigating the relation between product market 
competition and managerial behavior. 
1.4 Why Corporate Mergers and Acquisitions 
The acquisition of one firm by another or the merger of two companies is one of the 
most dramatic or controversial activity in corporate finance. Tremendous amounts of 
resources are involved every year in mergers and acquisitions (M&A). In the US alone, 
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the yearly average of the number of corporate M&A is close to 10000 over the last two 
decades. For example, US companies announced 10833 M&A in 2000 with a total value 
in excess of $1.28 trillion. Significant accounting and finance research resources have 
focused on understanding the value creation process related to M&A, as well as to the 
factors that drive them. Researchers have suggested that corporate restructurings such as 
M&A, leveraged buy-outs, spin-offs, etc. play an important role in helping the economy 
adjust to significant competitive changes in the last several decades. The competition 
among alternative management teams for corporate resources allows firms to move huge 
amounts of economic resources to their most efficient and valuable use. Theoretically, 
substantial benefits for the economy and the shareholders are to be generated in the 
process. Empirical evidence however point to a different picture. It is frequently found 
that shareholders of the acquiring firm do not enjoy any significant gains. Thus, 
researchers have questioned the motives for M&A. With managers acting as agents more 
interested in promoting their own benefits, M&A have been considered as a major 
conduit through which managerial shirking prevails. Thus, what started as a likely 
response to competition is burdened with agency problems of various kinds. The setting 
represents an ideal situation for my investigation of the effect of product market 
competition on managerial behavior in the context of agency theory. Before I go into 
details in the following chapters, below is a presentation of the theoretical framework of 
this study. 
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Figure 1. Theoretical Framework of This Study 
Competition Increase; 
Managerial Slack 
Worse M&A decision 
PMC 
Manager Behavior 
1.. Lower CAR 
2. Higher m erger premium paid 
3.Diversfying M&A 
4,Increase agency cost (for 
dominant, firm") 
Competition Reduces 
Managerial Slack 
Better M&A decision 
1. Higher CAR 
2.Lower merger premium paid 
3 .non-diversfying M&A 
4.Reduce agency cost (for 
dominant firm) 
Based on the literature review that competition could have opposite effects on 
managerial behavior, I do not make any assumptions regarding how managers behave in 
M&A. Instead, I will examine the effects of product market competition on M&A 
empirically and deduce from the results how managers have behaved. As shown in the 
figure, the four investigations that I will conduct in this study include 
a) How do investors react to M&A announcements? 
b) What is the size of the premium paid? 
c) Do firms engage in diversifying M&A when facing competition? 
d) How do dominant firms behave in M&A? 
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If product market competition improves efficiency and cuts managerial slack, 
investors would have responded positively to M&A announcements. The acquirer 
manager would have avoided paying an excessive premium; acquiring firms would have 
likely avoided diversification M&A; and acquirers that are also dominant firms in their 
industries would have acted in the interests of the shareholders. If product market 
competition decreases efficiency and increases managerial shirking, investors would have 
responded negatively to M&A announcements. The acquirer manager would have paid an 
excessive premium; acquiring firms would have likely pursued diversification M&A; and 
acquirers that are also dominant firms in their industries would have acted to promote the 
interests of the managers only. 
The organization of the dissertation is as follows. Chapter2 discusses the motive for 
mergers and acquisitions. Chapter 3 discusses the issue of the manager's propensity to 
diversify the firm when facing competition. Chapter 4 discusses the relation between 
competition and the size of merger premiums. Chapter 5 describes the sample and 
methodology. Chapter 6 shows the results for each issue. Chapter 7 summarizes the 
findings and concludes with a short discussion of the study's possible extensions. 
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Chapter 2 
Motives for Mergers and Acquisitions 
To evaluate managerial behavior in corporate mergers and acquisitions, an 
understanding of the motives for M&A is required. Existing studies on mergers and 
acquisitions have classified motives for mergers and acquisitions into five broad 
categories including (1) market timing, (2) response to industry shocks, (3) agency, (4) 
hubris, and (5) synergy. The theories behind these motives are based on different sets of 
assumptions and investors are predicted to respond differently. 
2.1 Market Timing 
In market timing models, it is argued that acquiring firms deliberately time their 
M&A decisions in order to take advantage of the stock market's over-valuations of their 
common stocks. Since market misvaluations tend to occur in clusters over time, market 
timing models suggest that M&A also occur in waves. However, market timing models in 
general do not focus on the self-interests of managers. That is, market timing could be 
consistent with either promoting the welfare of shareholders and/or the personal benefits 
of the acquiring manager. 
Shleifer and Vishny (2003) introduced a model of mergers and acquisitions based on 
stock market misvaluations of both the target and acquiring firms. The authors assume 
that investors could be irrational and firms are hence incorrectly valued form time to 
time. Managers are hypothesized to take advantage of share value mispricing through 
merger activity, using overvalued shares to takeover firms whose shares are relatively 
less overvalued. The authors also predict that acquiring firms whose shares are 
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overvalued prefer to use stock-exchange as the choice of payment medium, whereas 
firms whose shares are not overpriced tend to use cash to buy out the targets. Also it is 
hypothesized that overvalued acquirers have a tendency to pay a larger premium for the 
target. In general, it is expected that overvalued acquirers, after the M&A, would see a 
decline in firm performance as investors recognize the earlier misvaluation. Dong, 
Hirshleifer, Richardson and Teoh (2006) test the Shleifer and Vishny model and provide 
strong empirical support. Dong et al. (2006) use two proxies to measure market 
misevaluation: the price-to-book value of equity (P/B) ratio and the price to residual 
income value (P/V) ratio. According to Dong et al., P/V is less controversial because it 
does not measure misvaluation based on historical cost. P/V is a better measure because 
residual income value is a forward-looking information given by analysts' forecasts of 
future earnings. Using a long sample period from 1978 to 2000, Dong et al.(2006) 
examined the pre-1990 and the 1990-2000 merger waves. Some major results of their 
study include (1) acquirers are more highly overvalued than targets; (2) more overvalued 
targets are more often be purchased by equity than by cash; (3) high-valuation acquirers 
are more likely to use stock rather than cash in acquiring targets and they also tend to pay 
higher premium especially when stock is the payment method; (4) acquisitions by 
overvalued acquirers are frequently followed by lower post-merger abnormal returns. 
Another important market timing model is developed by Rhodes-Kropf and 
Viswanathan (2004). Their model assumes the managers of the target and acquirer firms 
are rational, but the target manager does not have information about the value of the 
equity offered by the acquirer. The target manager also does not have information about 
the value of the merger to the acquirer due to the market's misvaluations of the stocks of 
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the target and acquirer. According to the authors, there are two components of market 
misevaluation of share value - a firm-specific component and a market-wide component. 
Acquirer firm managers know the stand-alone value of their firms and also the potential 
value of the merger. The target manager knows the stand-alone value of his firm but does 
not know the components of the misvaluation, and therefore finds it difficult to assess the 
offer. In a follow-up study, Rhodes-Kropf, Robinson and Viswanathan (2005) 
empirically test and find support for the predictions of their model as well as those of the 
Shleifer and Vishny model. Rhodes-Kropt et al. (2005) decompose the M/B ratio of a 
firm into two components: market to true value and true value to book value. The first 
component measures market misvaluation due to either irrational behavior or information 
asymmetry that could be firm-specific or industry-wide. The second component measures 
growth opportunities without being contaminated by the mispricing part. There are 
several important findings in their study. First, they find that acquiring firms are valued 
significantly higher than targets. Second, a large part of the difference in M/B between 
acquirers and targets is due to the difference in their firm-specific misvaluation. About 
60% of the acquirer's M/B is attributable to firm-specific misvaluation, while almost 
none of the target's M/B is attributable to firm-specific misvaluation. Third, acquirers and 
targets are frequently firms in industries with high sector-wide misvaluations. That is, 
they tend to share a misvaluation component that stems from common causes in the 
sector. Fourth, cash targets are typically undervalued while equity targets are slightly 
overvalued. Similarly, cash acquirers are less overvalued than equity acquirers. Fifth, low 
long-run value-to-book firms tend to buy high long-run value-to-book firms. The average 
long-run value-to-book component of M/B of targets is three to five times higher than 
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that of acquirers. Sixth, sector-wide misvaluation explains about 15% of acquisition 
activity. That is, factors such as industry productivity shocks also play an important role 
in explaining merger waves. Finally, they observe unambiguous evidence that 
misvaluation waves drive merger waves. During merger waves, highly overvalued 
bidders account for 65% of the merger activities. 
2.2 Response to Industry Shocks 
Some researchers consider mergers as responses to various industry shocks induced 
by regulatory changes, price shocks, technology breakthroughs, etc. Firms engage in 
M&A to improve efficiency and increase profitability. Investors are hypothesized to 
respond positively to such M&A because firm value is expected to be higher after the 
merger. Several types of mergers that are related to industry shocks have been examined 
in the literature. Coase (1937) posits that technology is a major determinant of firm size 
and thus suggests that technological change is a motive for mergers and acquisitions. 
According to Jarrell, Brickley, and Netter (1988), the antitrust deregulations of the 1980s 
provide a major impetus for corporate takeovers in the affected industries. Similarly, 
Weston and Chung (1990) point out that the takeover activities in 1980s have been high 
in industries that have either undergone deregulation or experienced oil price shocks. 
They cited the corporate restructurings among airlines, oil firms, and telecommunication 
companies were basically responses to structural changes in the competitive market. 
Jensen (1993) also suggests that input price shocks are related to merger activity, such as 
the merger activities in the 1980s that are primarily responses to the energy price 
volatility in 1970s. Comment and Schwert (1995) argue that relatively broad-based 
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economic factors, rather than state laws and firm-specific antitakeover amendments, are 
responsible for the occurrence of M&A. 
In evaluating the relation between takeover activities and broad based economic 
changes, Mitchell and Mulherin (1996) examined industry-level merger activities across 
51 industries between 1982 and 1989 and find significant differences in both the rate and 
time-series clustering of these activities. They find the links between M&A and industry 
shocks such as deregulation, energy shocks, foreign competition and financing 
innovations are significant, especially those involving deregulations and financing 
innovations. Along the same line, Mulherin and Boone (2000) study the acquisition and 
divestiture activity of a sample of 1305 firms from 59 industries between 1990 and 1999. 
They find significant clustering in both acquisitions and divestitures over time, which 
they argue is consistent with the implication that economic change is a driving force for 
M&A. Andrade and Stafford (2004) find that firms involved in same-industry mergers 
tend to have excess capacity before the merger. The authors consider such finding 
consistent with the view that takeover is an effective means for industries with excess 
capacity to induce exit and utilize resources more efficiently. 
In comparing the relative significance of industry shocks and market timing as the 
motive for mergers and acquisitions, Hartford (2005) studies the industry-level merger 
waves in 1980s and 1990s. Despite he agrees that economic, regulatory or technological 
shocks are important factors responsible for industry merger waves, he further adds that 
for merger waves to exist there must be sufficient capital liquidity to make takeovers 
occur. That is, this liquidity component causes industry merger waves to cluster even if 
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industry shocks do not. In short, Hartford finds both market timing and industry shocks 
responsible for M&A waves. 
2.3 The Agency Motive 
According to the agency motive, some takeovers are motivated by the self-interest of 
the acquiring manager. Corporate managers are hypothesized to put their personal 
interests ahead of those of firm owners. A number of reasons have been suggested for 
such phenomena. Amihud and Lev (1981) suggest that mergers help the acquiring 
manager to diversify his own portfolio risk. Managers who have few avenues to diversify 
their own risk therefore are likely to pursue diversifying M&A. Hence, these authors 
linked merger and diversification activities to the self-serving behavior of the firm 
manager. Jensen (1986) postulates that acquiring managers use the acquiring firm's free 
cash flow for M&A in order to expand the firm size. As a consequent, the acquiring firm 
will depend more on the acquiring manager to run the company (Shleifer and Vishny 
(1989)). The common theme in most of these explanations is that acquisitions result in 
the extraction of value from the acquirer shareholders to by the acquirer manager. Such 
management actions result in agency costs that reduce the total value of the combined 
firm available to shareholders. Another important implication in these studies is that the 
target firm is identified by the acquiring manager as one that is most suited to increase his 
personal benefits. Target shareholders, realizing their value in such situations, would 
extract some of the value from the merger. The more severe the agency problem, the 
higher the gain enjoyed by the target shareholders. Very often, the target and acquirer 
gains are negatively related. Empirical studies on mergers have documented supportive 
20 
findings for the agency motive. Dodd (1980) found that the return to the acquirer firm is 
significantly negative following takeover announcements. Malatesta (1983) finds that 
mergers are value-creating transactions for target firms but value-destroying transactions 
for acquiring firms and concludes that takeovers are motivated by agency cost. 
2.4 The Hubris Motive 
The models of agency and hubris are quite similar in predicting a value destroying 
effect of mergers. There are slight differences between the two in terms of the behavior of 
the corporate manager. The agency cost hypothesis suggests that corporate managers 
perform takeovers because they want to enhance their personal benefits by expanding the 
firm size. The hubris hypothesis argues that corporate managers engage in M&A because 
their managerial pride make mistakes in evaluating target firms, and engage in 
acquisitions even when there is no synergy (Roll 1986). Since the synergy is presumed 
zero, the payment to the target firm represents a wealth transfer from the acquirer to the 
target. The higher the target gain, the lower the bidder gain, and that the total gain is zero. 
In its strictest form, one would not positive total gains in takeovers. For empirical 
evidence, Moeller, Schlingemann, and Stulz (2004) show that larger firms, which are 
more likely run by hubris-filled managers, tend to offer higher takeover premium and are 
more likely to complete a takeover than their smaller counterparts. Hayward and 
Hambrick (1997) finds a significant loss in the acquirer's shareholder value following an 
acquisition, and the greater the CEO hubris and acquisition premium, the greater the 
shareholders' losses. 
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2.5 The Synergy Motive 
The synergy hypothesis assumes that managers act to maximize shareholders wealth. 
The theory posits that firms would engage in acquisitions only if they result in gains to 
shareholders of the acquirer and target. The synergy theory therefore predicts a positive 
post-merger performance. Jensen and Ruback (1983) find evidence that corporate 
takeovers generate positive gains, in which target firm shareholders gain and yet the 
bidding firm shareholders do not lose. Healy, Palepu and Ruback (1992) examine 
post-acquisition performance of the fifty largest U.S. mergers between 1979 and 
mid-1984. They find that merged firms experienced significant improvements in asset 
productivity relative to their industries, leading to higher operating cash flow returns. 
This performance improvement is particularly strong for firms with highly overlapping 
businesses. They consider the finding support of the synergy motive for M&A. Bradley, 
Desai and Kim (1988) study a sample of tender offers that occurred in the period from 
1963 to 1984 and document a combined value increase for the target and acquiring firms 
by an average of 7.4 percent. They conclude that "successful tender offers generate 
synergistic gains and lead to a more efficient allocation of corporate resources" (p. 13). 
Maksimovic and Phillips (2001) find that acquisition on average results in productive 
gains for the assets acquired; a result that is consistent with the synergy hypothesis. 
2.6 Hypotheses Development 
Of the above-mentioned five motives generally considered in finance literature, the 
hypotheses of market timing, agency, and hubris imply a loss in the firm value for the 
acquiring firm. Hence it is expected that investors would react negatively to takeover 
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announcements. On the other hand, the models of synergy and industry response suggest 
that firm value is likely to be increased. Thus, we expect a positive response from 
investors when such takeovers are announced. Existing studies on the motives for M&A 
do not specifically address market competition in their models. So there is no a priori 
prediction linking managerial behavior and motives for M&A when the market is 
competitive. Thus, I make inferences regarding managerial behavior in M&A by 
observing investors' responses. I specifically control for the effect of competition in my 
analysis. 
If product market competition improves efficiency and cuts managerial slack, 
investors would have responded positively to M&A announcements. Acquirers that are 
also dominant firms in their industries would have acted in the interests of the 
shareholders. This leads to the following hypotheses: 
Hypothesis la: Acquiring firms in more competitive industries are likely to enjoy 
higher stock returns when they announce merger and acquisition decisions. 
Hypothesis 2a: Dominant acquiring firms (acquirers with more agency problems) in 
more competitive industries are likely to have higher stock returns when they make 
merger and acquisition announcements. 
However, if product market competition decreases efficiency and increases 
managerial shirking, investors would have responded negatively to M&A 
announcements. Acquirers that are also dominant firms in their industries would have 
acted to promote the interests of the managers only. This leads to the following 
hypotheses: 
23 
Hypothesis lb : Acquiring firms in more competitive industries are likely to have 
lower acquiring returns when they make merger and acquisition decisions. 
Hypothesis 2b: Dominant acquiring firms (acquirers with more agency problems) in 
more competitive industries are likely to have lower acquiring returns when they 
make merger and acquisition announcements. 
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Chapter 3 
Corporate Diversification and Competition 
The second issue I address in my dissertation is the manager's propensity to diversify 
the firm when facing competition. Based on the literature review of corporate 
diversification, if competition reduces managerial slack, it is likely that competition will 
lead to a lower diversification effort. If competition promotes managerial shirking, then 
the manager is more likely to diversify the firm. 
It is generally agreed in finance literature that corporate diversification destroys 
shareholder wealth, causing the shares of diversified firms sell at a discount. Yet, U.S. 
firms remain highly diversified. For example, Montgomery (1994) finds that two-thirds 
of the Fortune 500 companies had at five distinct lines of business (defined by four-digit 
SIC codes) as late as 1992. From 1990 to 1996, diversified firms accounted for nearly 
50% of U.S. employment and owned about 60% of the total assets of publicly traded 
firms. 
3.1 Diversification and Agency Theory 
Among the various explanations for corporate diversifications, agency theory 
considers diversification the outcome of managers pursuing self-interest at the expense of 
firm owners. Managers have a desire to diversify because a larger firm size is expected to 
(1) increase their compensation (Jensen and Murphy, 1990), power, and prestige (Jensen, 
1986); (2) enhance their job security with the firm by making investments that require 
their particular skills via manager-specific investments (Shleifer and Vishny, 1990a,b); or 
(3) reduce the risk of their personal investment portfolio by reducing firm risk (Amihud 
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and Lev, 1981). Agency models argue that corporate diversification aggravates 
managerial agency problems. In diversified firms, managers are more likely to over 
invest given their access to an internal market for capital. Wulf (1998) suggests agency 
problems in diversified firms could lead to efficiency problems because the managers of 
large, established divisions have an incentive to use their influence to skew capital 
budgeting in their favor. In addition, efficiency problems may result in diversified firms 
given that the information asymmetry problem within the firm is relatively more severe 
than non-diversified firms. Some researchers even argue that diversified firms become 
less efficient as divisional managers do not have incentives to work hard when they 
cannot influence the performance of other divisions. In short, agency models suggest that 
diversification is associated with an inefficient allocation of capital within diversified 
firms. Agency models, however, have not considered the impact of competition. If one 
agrees with conventional models that competition promote managerial efforts, then it is 
likely that agency problems are mitigated in diversified firms. In the extreme situation, 
one might see a movement away from diversification if competition promotes the need to 
enhance efficiency. On the other hand, if competition promotes managerial shirking, then 
it is likely that the firm would pursue further diversifications so that managers can 
entrench more and consume more perquisites. 
3.2 Diversification and Competition 
Without relying on agency arguments, Villalonga (2000) posits that the motives for 
diversification are anti-competition responses. She argues that firms diversify in order to 
beat competition. For example, diversified firms can use the profits generated by the firm 
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in one industry to support predatory pricing in another. Firms could also diversify in 
order to form an ally with other firms that compete with the firm simultaneously in 
multiple markets. Firms might use corporate diversification to engage in reciprocal 
buying with other large firms in order to squeeze out smaller competitors. The idea that 
some firms acquire other firms in order to survive or remove the threat of competition is 
not new. Researchers who have suggested this include Dann and DeAngelo (1988), 
Shleifer and Vishny (1989), and Berkovitch and Narayanan (1993). Some banks in the 
1980s and early 1990s actually announced that they were acquiring other bank in order to 
remain independent. However, the anti-competition explanation does not explicit address 
the agency motives in the model. It is possible that firms diversify to avoid competition 
so that the managers could protect their self-interests more securely. On the other hand, 
firms may diversify to squeeze out competitors with the intent to increase profitability. In 
short, this line of explanation does not indicate clearly if diversification creates or 
destroys value. 
3.3 Diversification and Economies of Scope 
Another explanation offered by researchers on the motives for corporate 
diversification is related to the idea of economies of scope. Diversified firms enjoy 
economies of scope in various functions such as marketing and distribution. In the 
marketing aspect, diversified firms could use strategies such as product bundling, product 
lining, and family branding to more efficiently market the firm's products. Diversified 
firms could use the same distribution channel to sell the firms services and goods. 
Similarly, the firm could use its corporate staffs to support operations in different lines of 
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operations. Lewellen (1971) postulates that diversified firms have lower cash flow 
volatilities because of the coinsurance effect derived from combining businesses whose 
cash flows are less than perfectly correlated. In addition, a diversified firm's cash flows 
may support an internal capital market. Having an internal market to fund the firm's 
needs for capital offers a number of possible sources of value to the firm's owners. First 
of all, internally raised equity capital is less costly than funds raised in the external capital 
market. The firm avoids the transaction costs associated with the sale of securities to the 
public, as well as the costs of overcoming information asymmetry problems encountered 
when selling securities in the capital market. Furthermore, with an internal source of 
financing, the firm's managers can exercise superior decision control over project 
selection, rather than leaving the firm's investment decisions to the whims of less 
well-informed investors in the external capital market. Finally, corporate diversification 
may create shareholder value by mitigating failures in product, labor, and financial 
markets. This could be particularly important in emerging and less developed markets. In 
this strand of literature, diversification is considered a firm-value enhancing activity. The 
stipulations offered by these models are consistent with the implication that managers 
strive to improve firm efficiency through diversification and diversification creates value. 
3.4 Diversification Destroys Firm Value 
Theoretical models have contradictory predictions regarding the effect of 
diversification on firm value. Empirical studies are also dotted with inconsistent findings. 
Some researchers conclude that diversified firms destroy value based on the evidence that 
diversified firms tend to have lower Tobin's Q; their shares are traded at discounts of up 
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to 15%, when compared to the share value of comparable stand-alone firms; they face an 
increased likelihood of being broken up through reorganization that varies directly with 
the size of the discount; and the stock market tends to react favorably to increases in 
corporate focus. In general, it is argued that diversified firms are more likely to 
misallocate their resources. Many studies have found empirical evidence supporting the 
capital misallocation hypothesis. Shin and Stulz (1988) find that divisions of a diversified 
firms cross-subsidize each other in terms of cash flow needs. But the sensitivity of a 
division's capital expenditures to the cash flows of the other divisions within the 
conglomerate firm does not depend on whether its investment opportunities are better 
than those of the firm's other divisions. This may lead to over investment. 
Scharfstein (1998) supports the cross-subsidization hypothesis when he finds that 
diversified firms invest too much in low Q segments and too little in high Q segments. 
There is some evidence that the diversification discount suffered by diversified firms is 
caused by agency problems. For example, Palia (1999) finds that the diversification 
discount is diminished by larger pay-performance sensitivity and by smaller board size. 
Similarly, Anderson et al. (1998) finds that CEOs in diversified firms have lower stock 
ownership, higher levels of pay and lower sensitivity of pay to firm performance. Some 
researchers have argued that the diversification discount might be a result of lower 
efficiency instead of agency problems. Maksimovic and Philips (2001) find that 
conglomerate firms are less productive than single-segment firms of similar size. Finally, 
researchers have also concluded that diversification is value destroying based on the 
results of short- and long-term event studies. For example, based on a sample of mergers 
from 1981 to 1984, Bradley et al. (1988) find that acquirers suffer negative abnormal 
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returns close to 3%. Agrawal et al. (1992) find that acquiring firms suffer a statistically 
significant loss of 10% during the five-year post-merger period. Megginson et al. (2000) 
examine long-term abnormal returns for mergers that increase corporate diversification 
and find that these firms suffer a loss in stockholder wealth of 25% by the third 
post-merger year. 
On the other hand, activities that increase a firm's focus have been found to increase 
share value. For example, Desai and Jain (1999) find that long-run abnormal returns 
during the three- year period after a focus-increasing spin-off are 47% greater than the 
returns to firms that engage in non-focus-increasing spinoffs. 
3.5 Diversification Creates Firm Value 
In more recent studies on diversification, researchers argue that diversification in fact 
is associated with a premium instead of a discount. These researchers argue that data and 
methodological issues have led to previous conclusions that diversified firms suffer a 
value discount relative to their non-diversified counterparts. In some studies, researchers 
question the interpretation of the diversification discount or even its validity. For 
example, Graham, Lemmon, and Wolf (1999) or Campa and Kedia (1999) suggest that 
the discount should not be interpreted as value destruction due to diversification, since 
firms which diversify are already discounted prior to diversifying. Villalonga (2000a,c) 
claims that after correcting for data problems (Compustat segment classification bias), a 
sample of diversified firms that traded at a discount earlier now is found to trade at a 
significant premium when compared to non-diversified firms from the same industry. 
Hadlock et al. (2001) find that seasoned equity offerings of diversified firms have a less 
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negative market reaction than focused firms. They attribute the reason to the better access 
to capital markets by diversified firms than focused firms due to valuation problems 
faced by investors in the presence of asymmetric information. Moreover, Denis and 
Thothadri (1998) find that previous studies of diversified firms exhibit substantial 
cross-sectional variability in their findings. Morck and Yeung (1998) show that 
cross-industry diversification, geographic diversification and firm size add value in the 
presence of intangibles related to R&D or advertising, but destroy value in the absence of 
these intangibles. Thus, there is some evidence that diversification may add value to the 
firm. 
3.6 Hypotheses Development 
If product market competition improves efficiency and cuts managerial slack, 
investors would have responded positively to M&A announcements. Acquiring firms 
would have likely avoided diversification M&A. However, if product market competition 
decreases efficiency and increases managerial shirking, acquiring firms would have likely 
pursued diversification M&A. This leads to the following hypotheses: 
Hypothesis 3a: Acquiring firms in more competitive industries are likely to pursue 
non-diversifying acquisitions. 
Hypothesis 3b: Acquiring firms in more competitive industries are likely to pursue 
diversifying acquisitions. 
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Chapter 4 
Competition and Acquisition Premium 
Researchers have found that firm and deal characteristics affect the premium paid by 
the bidder. For example, Officer (2003) finds that takeover premiums are significantly 
higher in takeovers that are paid with cash. Huang and Walkling (1987) suggest that this 
is likely due to the tax-related consequences of cash offers. Officer also finds that the 
premium size is related to the market values of the bidder and target. Larger bidders tend 
to offer higher premiums whereas large targets are likely to receive lower premiums. This 
is consistent with Moller et al. (2004) that there is a firm size effect on takeover premium. 
According to Officer (2003), premiums are higher in intra-industry mergers than in 
inter-industry transactions, except in the financial services industry. It is observed that 
bank mergers in general have significantly lower premiums than takeovers in other 
industries. Premiums are also higher if the bidder uses a tender offer during the 
acquisition process, but significantly lower when the bidder has a toehold ownership of 
more than 5% of the target's outstanding equity. Bidders with high market-to-book ratios 
(growth opportunities) are likely to pay significantly higher premiums. Rhoades-Kropf et 
al. (2005) show that the market-to-book ratio of the acquiring firm could be decomposed 
to reflect several types of market misvaluation of the acquirer's firm value. A higher 
market-to-book ratio suggests a higher degree of misvaluation. Thus, Officer's findings 
imply that more overvalued acquirers are more likely to pay higher premiums. This is 
consistent with expositions of Shleifer and Vishy (2003) and Rhodes-Kropf and 
Viswanthan (2004). Contrary to Officer's findings, Schwert (2000) finds only weak 
evidence that takeover premiums are negatively related to target firm size. His 
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investigation shows that a decrease of $57 million in equity capitalization increases the 
premium received by the target by 1 percent. In addition, Shcwert finds that firm 
performance variables are not reliably related to takeover premiums. The observation is 
consistent with the results of Comment and Schwert (1995). Also consistent with the 
results of Officer (2003), Schwert finds that auctions, cash offers, and tender offers all 
lead to higher than average premiums. 
Moeller et al. (2004) specifically examine the relation between the size of the bidder 
and takeover premiums. They find empirical evidence that large bidders tend to pay more 
for acquisitions. The premium paid increases with firm size after controlling for firm and 
deal characteristics. In addition, large firms are also more likely to complete an offer. 
Their finding is consistent with the hubris motive for M&A and the empire-building 
hypothesis of agency theory. Both the hubris and agency models suggest that the higher 
takeover premium represents a loss suffered by the shareholders of the acquiring firm. 
This is consistent with the finding of Moeller et al. that the combined dollar return of the 
target and acquiring firms significantly negative for large firms. That is, larger acquirers 
are more likely to pursue value-decreasing acquisitions. In other words, there are no 
dollar synergy gains for acquisitions by large firms. The hubris and/or empire-building 
hypotheses are very consistent with the findings observed by Moeller et al., (2004) that 
large acquirers paying higher premiums also have a higher success rate in their takeover 
bids. That is, large bidders likely pay more due to either overestimation or fulfillment of 
self-interests instead of promoting the welfare of the firm. 
Gupta and Misra (2007) question if larger bid premiums represent a source of wealth 
transfer from acquiring to target firm shareholders or do they signal greater expected 
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merger gains? They argue it depends on the market's assessment of the managerial 
objectives of the bidding firm. Good managers link corporate restructurings such as 
M&A with maximizing firm value. Managers interested in personal benefits may initiate 
mergers to maximize personal gains at the expense of the firm's shareholders. The 
authors hypothesize that value-enhancing managers will bid higher premiums only if they 
expect the takeover to have larger value creating potential. Thus, the size of the bid 
premium may serve as a signal of deal quality, and this implies a positive relation 
between merger gains and the size of the takeover premium. On the other hand, managers 
with agency motives would pay a higher premium if they expect larger personal gains 
even though at the expense of the shareholders. Thus, it implies a negative relation 
between merger gains and the size of the takeover premium. Their results find empirical 
evidence that premium size is positively related to the size of the merger gain for 
value-enhancing deals. That is, the bid premium may likely serve as a signal of deal 
quality in value-enhancing takeovers. In addition, Gupta and Misra (2007) find that 
managerial compensation also influence M&A decisions. Their results show that highly 
paid CEOs are more likely to engage in value-enhancing mergers, compared to CEOs 
who are not highly paid. 
The size of the takeover premium may also be related to the market misvalutaion of 
the acquiring firm's share value. In the merger-waves models of Rhoades-Kropf et al. 
(2005) and Shleifer and Vishny (2004), it is postulated that acquiring firms tend to use 
their overvalued shares to buyout targets whose shares are relatively less overvalued. A 
higher overvaluation of the bidder's share value might lead to a larger bid premium in 
takeover transactions. Since market misvaluations tend to occur in clusters, possibly 
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affected by herd-like investor optimism or pessimism, mergers and acquisitions also tend 
to occur in waves over time. So it is likely that when the market is overvalued (investors 
are over- optimistic), higher takeover premiums are the norm. When the market is 
depressed (investors are over-pessimistic), lower takeover premiums are more likely. A 
casual observation of the history of M&A transactions appears to support this conjecture. 
Before the dot.com bubble of the technology industry occurred in the 1995-2001 period, 
high-tech start-ups were gulped by other high-tech firms at stratospheric premiums. 
Misvaluations of technology firms were rampant during this period, yet investors seldom 
complained about the excessive takeover premiums paid by acquiring firms. 
The choice of payment method in corporate mergers and acquisitions is also likely 
linked to the size of the acquisition premium. Some researchers indicate the choice of 
acquisition financing is driven by the desire of the acquiring manager to maintain control 
of the acquiring firm (see, e.g., Stulz, 1988; Amihud et al., 1990; Ghosh and Ruland, 
1998). Such managers are more likely willing to pay a higher premium. Faccio and 
Masulis (2005) suggest that the payment method in M&As is largely a tradeoff between 
the threats of corporate control and financing constraints. Other researchers have related 
the choice of payment method in M&As to the asymmetric information between the 
acquiring firm and outsiders (Travlos, 1987; Hansen, 1987; Shleifer and Vishny, 2003; 
Rhodes-Kropf et al., 2005; Dong et al., 2006). It is generally argued that the acquiring 
firm will prefer stock financing when the acquiring manager believes his firm's stock is 
overvalued. Thus, cash deals are likely to have lower takeover premiums and stock deals 
are more likely to have higher premiums. 
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4.1 Hypotheses Development 
If product market competition improves efficiency and cuts managerial slack, the 
acquirer manager would have avoided paying an excessive premium; and acquirers that 
are also dominant firms in their industries would have acted in the interests of the 
shareholders. Therefore, they would not pay an excessive premium. This leads to the 
following hypotheses: 
Hypothesis 4a: Acquiring firms in more competitive industries are less Likely to 
overpay the acquisition premium for mergers and acquisitions. 
Hypothesis 5a: Dominant acquiring firms (acquirers with more agency problems) in 
more competitive industries are less likely to overpay the acquisition premium for 
mergers and acquisitions. 
In contrast, if product market competition decreases efficiency and increases 
managerial shirking, the acquirer manager would have paid an excessive premium; and 
acquirers that are also dominant firms in their industries would have acted to promote the 
interests of the managers only. Therefore, they would pay an excessive premium. This 
leads to the following hypotheses: 
Hypothesis 4b: Acquiring firms in more competitive industries are more likely to 
overpay the acquisition premium for mergers and acquisitions. 
Hypothesis 5b: Dominant acquiring firms (acquirers with more agency problems) in 
more competitive industries are more likely to overpay the acquisition premium for 
mergers and acquisitions. 
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Chapter5 
Data and Methodology 
5.1 Sample Description 
I examine a sample of successful U.S. mergers and acquisitions occurring between 
1986 and 2006.The sample is drawing from the Securities Data Corporation's (SDC) U.S. 
Merger and acquisitions data base by using the following criteria: 
1. The MA event is completed. 
2. All bidders are public firms. 
3. The deal value of MA event is over one million U.S. dollars. 
4. Bidders acquire at least 50% of targets, thereby implying control. 
5. The method of payment only includes all cash, all stock, and mixed. 
For merger premium, I require the one-month merger premium data is either directly 
available from SDC database or can be calculated from the information I get from SDC 
database. 
Then I collect the annual financial statement information of firms from Compustat 
and stock return data from the CRSP. The data for PMC is obtained from the segments 
database in Compustst on WRDS. The insider holding information and institutional 
holding information are obtained from Thomson Financial database. All dollar items are 
CPI-adjusted to year 2006 to adjust for the effect of inflation. 
As panel A of table 1 shows, the sample consists of 5265 completed U.S. merger and 
acquisitions (listed in SDC) between 1986 and 2006 made by public U.S. firms. Panel A 
also reports annual mean and median bidder market value of equity, deal value, and 
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relative deal size, defined as the ratio of deal value to bidder market value of equity. Both 
bidder market value of equity and deal value appear to peak during the 1999-2000 
periods. 
Panel B of table 1 provides the distribution of merger premium sample. The sample 
consists of 750 completed U.S. merger and acquisitions (listed in SDC) between 1987 
and 2006 made by public U.S. firms. Panel B also reports annual mean and median 
premium (%) acquirer paid and the method of payments. The total annual mean and 
median premium (%) acquirer paid are 45% and 37%. In our sample, 357 firms choose to 
finance with stock only, 202 firms choose to finance with cash only, and 191 firms 
choose to finance with mixed. 
<Insert Table 1 here> 
5.2 Variable Construction 
In the next subsections, we discuss the measurement of three categories of variables: 
acquirer return and merger premium acquirer paid as our dependent variable, three 
determinants of competition (product substitutability, market size, and entry costs) as our 
interested explanatory variables, and acquirer- and deal-specific characteristics as our 
control variables. 
5.2.1 Acquirer Return 
I measured bidder announce effect by market model stock returns around initial 
acquisition announcements. The announcement dates are obtained from SDC's U.S. 
merger and acquisitions data base. I compute 2-day cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) 
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during the window encompassed by event days (0, +1), where event day 0 is the 
acquisition announcement date. I use the CRSP equal-weighted return as the market 
return and estimate the market model parameters over the 255-day period from event day 
-274 to event day -20. 
The market model is used to estimate normal or expected returns of common stocks 
of sample events. Market models assume that security returns follow a single factor 
market model, 
Rjt = aj+pjRmt+6j, (1) 
Where Rjt is the rate of return of common stock of the j - t firm on day t; Rmt is the rate 
of return of market index on day t; Sjt is a random variable that, by construction, must 
have an expected value of zero, and is assumed to uncorrelated with Rmt, uncorrected Rkt 
for k # j , not autocorrelated, and homoskedastic. (3j is a parameter that measures the 
sensitivity of Rjt to the market index. 
Abnormal return for the common stock of the j t h firm on day t is defined as: 
Aj, = R j t-(a j+p jRmt) (2) 
Where the coefficients Oj and Pj are ordinary least squares estimates of Oj and (3j in 
equation (1). The cumulative abnormal return (CAR) is calculated by summing average 
abnormal returns over the event period. 
As panel A of table 2 shows, the mean 2-day CAR for whole sample is 0.717%, 
significantly different from zero at 1% level. The median 2-day CAR for whole sample is 
0.253%. For deals financed with all cash, the mean CAR is about 0.997%o, which is 
significant (1% level). In contrast, for deals financed with all stock, the mean CAR is 
about -0.083%o, which is not significant. For deals financed with mixed payment, the 
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mean CAR is about 0.961%, which is significant (1% level). Acquisitions of subsidiary 
targets are associated with highest bidder return, with mean CAR of 1.568%. Next, the 
mean CAR of acquisitions of private targets is 1.214%, which is significant (1% level). 
However, deals involving public targets generate the lowest abnormal return to bidder 
shareholders, with the mean CAR of-2.014%, which is significant (1% level). I find the 
same pattern for median CARs. These results are consistent with those prior studies such 
as Moeller et al. (2004) and Masulis et al. (2007). 
5.2.2 Merger Premium 
For merger premium, I require the one-month merger premium data is either directly 
available from SDC database or can be calculated from the information we get from SDC 
database. 
As panel B of table 2 shows, the mean merger premium (%) for whole sample is 45%, 
significantly different from zero at 1% level. The median for whole sample is 37% and 
significant. 
<Insert Table 2 here> 
5.2.3 Measure of Competition 
Following with Karuna (2007), I focus on three determinants of competition: product 
substitutability, market size, and entry cost in this study. Prior studies predominantly use 
the level of concentration (Herfindahl index or the k-firm concentration ratio (CRk)) to 
proxy competition (Harris, 1998; Defond and Park, 1999; Engel et al., 2003; Masulis et 
al., 2007). These studies assume that market structure is exogenous, that price (and thus 
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unit margins) decline as concentration falls (Bain, 1956), and thus that lower 
concentration reflects higher competition. However, recent studies suggest that when 
market structure is assumed to be endogenous, it is not clear whether low values of 
concentration capture low or high competition, especially in cross-industry analyses (e.g., 
Aghion et al., 2001; Raith, 2003). The three determinants of competition in this study 
capture the different dimensions of competition as they illustrate how competition arises 
from product market fundamentals. Karuna (2007) suggest that there are numerous 
benefits to analyze the individual effects of each competition determinant, while 
controlling for the other two, given the level of concentration in the industry. First of all, 
controlling for the other determinants as well as the level of concentration makes it 
possible to test the incremental effect that each determinant has on CAR and merger 
premium. Second, some industries may defy uni-dimensional labels of competition, 
perhaps because both product substitutability and entry costs may be high, as is the case 
in their industry (Raith, 2003). I will discuss the role of each of these three determinants 
of competition next. 
5.2.3.1 Product Substitutability 
Most studies in the Industrial Organizations literature have used the price-cost margin 
to measure product substitutability in an industry. The price-cost margin is defined here 
as the negative reciprocal of the price elasticity of demand (Karuna, 2007). In other word, 
the price elasticity of demand has a positive relation with the extent of product 
substitutability. This suggests that low (high) levels of the price-cost margin signify high 
(low) levels of product substitutability. The closer to perfect competition an industry is, 
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the more prices approximates marginal cost. Therefore, the greater competition, the 
smaller the price-cost margin. Following with Karuna (2007), I calculate the price-cost 
margin as sales divided by operating costs, all at the four-digit SIC code level. My 
measures for product substitutability, or product differentiation, are labeled Diffl and 
Diff2. To obtain product substitutability, I compute industry sales and operating costs by 
taking the sum of primary industrial segment sales and operating costs for firms in a 
given industry, respectively. The higher the value of Diff, the higher the extent of 
differentiation, or lower substitutability. Based on definition of operating cost, I find that 
there two different ways to compute the sum of depreciation, depletion, and amortization 
in Compustat database(non-accumulated or accumulated). For Diffl, the operating cost is 
the sum of data41, datal89, datal4 and datal74. However for Diff2, the operating cost is 
the sum of data41, datal89, datal96. I will report Diffl and Diff2 in subsequent 
statistical analyses. 
I also assume that price-cost margin depends on firms' pricing strategies (reflecting 
market conduct), which in turn partly depend on exogenous factors related to product 
substitutability. A component of the price-cost margin can be regarded as endogenous, as 
it can be affected by other industry factors such as market structure. 
5.2.3.2 Market Size 
Market size mirrors the density of consumers in a market or industry. Following with 
Karuna (2007), I measure an industry's market size by industry sales. This reflects the 
fact that, when market demand for a product increases at any given price, sales of that 
product also increase. Table 3 shows that market size is highly skewed to the right. 
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However, its natural log transformation brings the mean and median values closer 
together. So, I use the log-transformed variable (labeled MKTSIZE) in subsequent 
statistical analyses. 
<Insert Table 3 here> 
5.2.3.3 Entry Cost 
Following with Karuna (2007), I define entry costs as the minimal level of investment 
(exogenous sunk cost) that must be incurred by each entrant firm to an industry prior to 
commencing production (i.e., set-up costs). To capture the minimal level of investment in 
a particular industry, I compute the weighted average gross value of the cost of property, 
plant and equipment for firms for which this is the primary industry (at the four-digit SIC 
code level), weighted by each firm's market share in this industry. I compute market 
share by dividing the segment sales figure for the primary industrial segment of a firm by 
the sum of the segment sales of all firms that have this particular industry as their primary 
industry. Table 3 shows that the entry costs measure is highly skewed; its natural log 
transformation is not. Therefore, I use the log-transformed entry costs measure (labeled 
ENTCOST) in subsequent statistical analyses. 
5.2.4 Control Variables 
In our regression analysis in this study, I include several control variables documented 
in prior research as having an effect on CAR model, diversifying acquisition decision 
model, and merger premium model. The definition of all variables is shown on table 4. 
<Insert Table 4 here> 
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5.2.4.1 Control Variables for CAR Model 
Prior studies predominantly use the level of concentration to proxy competition. 
Common indices of industry concentration are the k-firm concentration ratio (CRk) and 
the Herfindahl-Hirschman index (HHI) (e.g. Harris, 1998; Defend and Park, 1999; Engel 
et al., 2003; Masulis et al., 2007). I include the four-firm concentration ratio (labeled 
CONC) for an industry, which reflects the proportion of sales in an industry accounted 
for by the four largest firms (by sales). I obtain the data to compute CONC from the 
Segments database. In the initial regressions, I also consider Herfindahl-Hirschman index 
(HHI). Again, I obtain the data to compute HHI from the Segments database. 
In addition to the level of concentration, I also consider two groups of factors that are 
related to acquirer returns: bidder characteristics and deal characteristics. 
Bidder characteristics: The bidder traits that I control for are firm size, Tobin's q, 
leverage, free cash flow (FCF), liquidity, CEO equity ownership, and institutional 
ownership (BLOCK), all of which are measured at the fiscal year-end prior to the 
acquisition announcement, and pre-announcement stock price runup, which is measured 
over the 100-day window from event day -130 to event day -31. 
Moeller, Schlingemann, and Stulz (2004) find that bidder size is negatively correlated 
with the acquirer's announcement-period CAR. They interpret this size effect as evidence 
supporting the managerial hubris hypothesis (Roll (1986)), because they find that in 
general larger acquirers pay higher premiums and make acquisitions that generate 
negative dollar synergies. Hence, we would expect that manager of larger firms are more 
entrenched and more likely to make worse acquisitions decisions. I define firm size as 
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bidder's total assets (Compustat item 6). Table 3 shows that the total assets measure is 
highly skewed; its natural log transformation is not. Therefore, I use the log-transformed 
total assets measure (labeled Log Total assets) in subsequent statistical analyses. 
Prior studies find that an acquirer's Tobin's q has an ambiguous effect on CAR. Lang, 
Stulz, and Walking (1991) document a positive relation for tender offer acquisitions, 
while Moeller, Schlingemann, and Stulz (2004) find a negative relation in a 
comprehensive sample of acquisitions. Following with Masulis et al. (2007), I define 
Tobin's q as the ratio of a bidder's market value of assets over its book value of assets, 
where the market value of assets is computed as the book value of assets minus the book 
value of common equity (item 60) plus the market value of common equity (item 25 x 
item 199). 
According to Jensen's (1986) free cash flow hypothesis, I also control for the 
acquirer's financial leverage and FCF. Some researchers suggest that leverage is an 
important governance mechanism, since higher debt levels help reduce future free cash 
flows and limit managerial discretion (Stulz, 1990; Masulis et al., 2007). 
On the other hand, some researchers suggest that leverage provides incentives for 
managers to improve firm performance, since managers have to cede significant control 
to creditors and often lose their jobs if their firms fall into financial distress (Gilson and 
Vetsuypens, 1994; Baird and Rasmussen, 2001; Gilson (1989, 1990)). 
Powell and Yawson, (2007) suggest that firms with high growth, but low resources are 
more likely to be acquired by firms with opposite imbalance - low growth and high 
financial resource. Similarly, firms with low growth, but high financial resources are 
more likely to be acquired by firms with the opposite imbalance -high growth and low 
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financial resources. Therefore, I include leverage and liquidity as control variables and 
expect leverage to have a positive effect on CAR. The free cash flow hypothesis predicts 
a negative coefficient for current FCF, since managers at firms with more free cash flows 
have more resources available to them to engage in empire building. However, higher 
free cash flows can also proxy for better recent firm performance, which could be 
correlated with higher quality managers, who tend to make better acquisition decisions 
(Masulis et al., 2007). Therefore, FCF could turn out to be either positively or negatively 
related to acquirer announcement returns. Following with Masulis et al. (2007), leverage 
is defined as a firm's book value of long-term debt (item 9) and short-term debt (item 34) 
divided by its market value of total assets, and FCF is equal to operating income before 
depreciation (item 13) minus interest expense (item 15) minus income taxes (item 16) 
minus capital expenditures (item 128), scaled by book value of total assets. Following 
with Schwert (2000), liquidity is measured as the ratio of net liquid assets to total assets 
(items (4-5)/6). I also control for a bidder's stock price runup before the acquisition 
announcement. I measure the bidder's pre-announcement stock price runup by the 
bidder's buy-and-hold abnormal return, which is measured over the 100-day window 
from event day -130 to event day -31 with using the CRSP value-weighted market index 
as the benchmark. 
Masulis et al. (2007) suggest that equity ownership can help align the interests of 
managers with those of shareholders. Lewellen, Loderer, and Rosenfeld (1985) also find 
that bidder returns are increasing in bidder managers' stock ownership. I measure the 
CEO equity ownership as top 5 executives' percentage ownership of the firm. Cremers 
and Nair (2005) find evidence that the market for corporate control is effective only when 
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a firm's internal corporate governance is strong. To control for the effect of institutional 
ownership, I measure institutional ownership (BLOCK) as the fraction of bidder's 
common stock held by bidder's institutional blockholder. 
Both CEO equity ownership and institutional ownership (BLOCK) information are 
obtained from Thomson Financial database. Finally, to investigate the behavior of 
dominant firms in M&A, I create the dummy variable denoted by Dominant that is equal 
to one for firm having the largest market share at time t in a four-digit SIC industry and 
zero otherwise. 
Deal characteristics: I control for deal characteristics variables such as target ownership 
status, method of payment, relative deal size, and whether the bidders are from high tech 
industries. 
Fuller et al. (2002) find that acquirers have significantly negative abnormal returns 
when they acquire public target and significantly positive abnormal returns when they 
acquire private targets or subsidiaries. They argue that bidders capture a liquidity 
discount when they buy private or subsidiary targets. Moeller et al. (2004) also find 
similar results. In addition, they find that acquiring subsidiary targets generate the highest 
abnormal bidder returns. To control for target ownership status, I create three dummy 
variables denoted by public targets, private targets, and subsidiary target to represent 
targets in these three categories. 
Existing studies also suggest that the method of payment is also related to the stock 
market's response to acquisition announcements. It is generally believed that acquirers 
have significantly negative abnormal returns when they pay for their acquisitions with 
equity. This is generally attributed to the adverse selection problem in equity issuance 
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analyzed by Myers and Majluf (1984). To control for methods of payment, I create three 
dummy variables denoted by all cash deal and all stock deal, and mixed deal. Similar 
with Masulis et al., (2007), to fully capture the effects of target ownership status and deal 
payment method, I consider the interaction variables in subsequent statistical analyses. 
Asquith, Bruner, and Mullins (1983) and Moeller, Schlingemann, and Stulz (2004) find 
that bidder announcement returns increase in relative deal size, although the reverse is 
true for the subsample of large bidders in Moeller et al., (2004) paper. I also control for 
relative deal size, which is measured as deal value (from SDC) over bidder market value 
of equity. 
I also create a dummy variable denoted by high tech that equals one if acquirers are in 
high tech industries defined by Loughran and Ritter (2004) and zero otherwise, since 
Masulis et al., (2007) suggest that acquirers in these high tech transactions are more 
likely to underestimate the costs and overestimate the synergies generated by the 
combination. 
Based on the discussion in chapter 3, the predicted effect of diversifying acquisitions 
on bidder returns is ambiguous. It is generally agreed in finance literature that corporate 
diversification destroys shareholder wealth, causing the shares of diversified firms sell at 
a discount. Yet, U.S. firms remain highly diversified. For example, Montgomery (1994) 
finds that two-thirds of the Fortune 500 companies had at five distinct lines of business 
(defined by four-digit SIC codes) as late as 1992. However, some researchers argue that 
data and methodological issues have led to previous conclusions that diversified firms 
suffer a value discount relative to their non-diversified counterparts. For example, 
Graham, Lemmon, and Wolf (1998) or Campa and Kedia (1999) suggest that the 
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discount should not be interpreted as value destruction due to diversification, since firms 
which diversify are already discounted prior to diversifying. Villalonga (2000a,c) claims 
that after correcting for data problems (Compustat segment classification bias), a sample 
of diversified firms that traded at a discount earlier now is found to trade at a significant 
premium when compared to non-diversified firms from the same industry. To control for 
the effect of diversifying acquisitions on bidder returns, I classify an acquisition as 
diversifying if the target and the bidder do not share the same four-digit SIC code, and I 
create the dummy variable denoted by diversifying acquisition that is equal to one for 
diversifying acquisitions and zero otherwise. 
5.2.4.2 Control Variables for Diversifying Acquisition Decision Model and Merger 
Premium Model 
Based on the discussion in chapter 3 and chapter 4, I also consider the level of 
concentration and two groups of factors: bidder characteristics and deal characteristics. 
The definition of these variables is the same with those discussed above. However, for 
merger premium model, I also control for target characteristics at the same time. The 
definition of target characteristics is same with that of bidder characteristics. 
5.3 Methodology 
To examine the effects of product market competition on M&A empirically and 
deduce from the results how managers have behaved. I use the several equations to test. 
For Hypothesis 1,1 use the following equation: 
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CAR(0,+1) = po + Pi Diff + p2 Log Market Size(MKTSIZE) + p3 Log Entry Cost 
(ENTCOST) + p4 Concentration ratio(CONC) + p5 Log Total assets + p6 Tobin's Q + p7 
Leverage + p8 Free Cash Flow (FCF) + P9 Liquidity + P10 Stock price runup +Pn CEO 
equity ownership + P12 Block + Pn High tech + P14 Public target x all cash deal +P15 
Private target x all cash deal +P16 Subsidiary target x all cash deal +P17 Public target x all 
stock deal +pi8 Private target x all stock deal +P19 Subsidiary target x all stock deal +P20 
Relative deal size +P21 Diversifying acquisition + Year dummy +s (3) 
For Hypothesis 2, I use above equation (3) and adding dominant firm dummy variable 
and the interaction variables of PMC and dominant firm dummy variables. 
For Hypothesis 3,1 use the following equation: 
Diversifying acquisition =p0 +pi Diff +p2 Log Market Size(MKTSIZE) +p3 Log Entry 
Cost (ENTCOST) +p4 Concentration ratio(CONC) +p5 Dominant+p6 Log Total assets 
+p7 Tobin's Q +Ps Leverage +P9 Free Cash Flow (FCF) +P10 Liquidity +Pn Stock price 
runup +P12 CEO equity ownership +P13 Block +P14 High tech +P15 Public target x all cash 
deal +P16 Private target x all cash deal +Pn Subsidiary target x all cash deal +Pis Public 
target x all stock deal +P19 Private target x all stock deal +P20 Subsidiary target x all stock 
deal +P21 Relative deal size + Year dummy +s (4) 
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For Hypothesis 4,1 use the following equation: 
Merger premium=p0 +pi Diff +p2 Log Market Size(MKTSIZE) +p3 Log Entry Cost 
(ENTCOST) +|34 Concentration ratio(CONC) +p5 Dominant+ +(36 Tobin's QA +P7 
LeverageA +Ps Free Cash Flow (FCF)A +P9 Liquidity A+PIO Tobin's QT +P11 LeverageT 
+P12 Free Cash Flow (FCF)T +P13 Liquidity x+P 14 relative firm sizeA/T +P15 Relative deal 
size +P16 Diversifying acquisition +Pn all cash deal +pis all stock deal +Year dummy +8 
(5) 
For Hypothesis 5,1 use above equation (5) and adding the interaction variables of PMC 
and dominant firm dummy variables. \ 
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Chapter 6 
Empirical Results 
The results for the test conducted in this dissertation are given from table 5 to table 
17. 
6.1 The Results for CAR Model 
Table 5 provides the result for an OLS regression conducted on equation (3) in 
chapter 5. In column (1), I only consider the control variables and do not consider the 
three PMC variables. Consistent with previous studies, the coefficient of Log Total asset 
is -0.302 which is negative and significant at 1% level. This suggests that larger acquirers 
are more likely to pay higher premiums and make acquisitions that generate negative 
dollar synergies. Consistent with Moeller, Schlingemann, and Stulz (2004), the 
coefficient of Tobin's Q is -0.300 which is negative but is not significant. The coefficient 
of Leverage is -0.023 which is negative and significant at 5 % level. However the 
coefficient of free cash flow (FCF) and liquidity are -0.015 and 0.122, respectively. Both 
are not significant. The coefficient of liquidity is negative but not significant. 
I also control two other governance mechanisms: CEO equity ownership and 
institutional ownership (BLOCK). The coefficient of CEO equity ownership is almost 
closed to zero and not significant. The coefficient of BLOCK is -0.009 which is negative 
and significant. This finding is contrast with that of Masulis et al., 2007. In their paper, 
both the coefficients of CEO equity ownership and institutional ownership (BLOCK) are 
not significant. 
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The coefficient of high tech is negative and significant. This supports Masulis et al. 
(2007) argument that acquirers in these high tech industries are more likely to 
underestimate the cost and overestimate the synergies generated by combination. 
Following with Fuller et al. (2002), I control Target status and the method of 
payment. Our results show that acquirers experience significantly positive CAR when 
they buy subsidiary target Public target using all cash financing and buy private target 
using all stock financing. However they experience significantly negative CAR when 
they buy public target using all stock financing. Consistent with Moeller, Schlingemann, 
and Stulz (2004) finding, the coefficient of relative deal size is 1.634 which is positive 
and significant at 1% level. The coefficient of diversifying acquisition is -0.02 which is 
negative and not significant. 
In column (2) and column (3), I use Herfindahl index and four-firm concentration 
ratio (CONC) to proxy for competition as previous studies used. The coefficient of 
Herfindahl index and four-firm concentration ratio (CONC) are 1.559 and 1.544, 
respectively. Both coefficients are significant at 1% level. Higher CONC means less 
competition and higher Herfindal index also means less competition. The result suggests 
that firms make good M&As when there is less competition. However our result is 
contrast with Masulis et al.,(2007) result. In column (4) the coefficient of Diffl is -2.082 
and significant at 5% level; the coefficient of MKTSIZE is -0.227 and significant at 5% 
level; the coefficient of ENTCOST is 0.165 and significant at 10% level; and the 
coefficient of CONC is 0.468 but not significant. The interpretations for column (4) 
would be that: (1) Firms make bad M&As when Diff is high. A high Diff means lower 
substitutability, that is, less competition; (2) Firms make good M&As when MKTSIZE is 
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large (less competition); (3) Firms make good M&As when ENTCOST is high (less 
competition). 
In column (5), all three coefficients of product market competition (PMC) variables 
are not significant. The sign and figure of coefficients of control variables in column (2), 
column (3), column (4), and column (5) are similar with those in column (1). 
Based the results of this table, I argue that CONC and Herfindhal index gives ambiguous 
measures of competition and thus not reliable (as argued by Karuna, 2007). So using 
Diff, MKTSIZE, ENTCOST are more reliable. But Diff and MKTSIZE and ENTCOST 
give conflicting result in column 4 of table 5. In subsequent statistical analyses, I will 
also consider removing CONC and only consider one of three PMC variables when I run 
the regressions. 
<Insert Table 5 here> 
Table 6 provides the result for an OLS regression conducted on equation (3) in chapter 
5 but without CONC. In column (4) the coefficient of Diffl is -2.240 and significant at 
5% level; the coefficient of MKTSIZE is -0.269 and significant at 1% level; the 
coefficient of ENTCOST is 0.179 and significant at 10% level. In column (3) and column 
(5), the coefficient of Diffl and Diff2 are both negative and significant. In column (1) 
and column (6), the coefficients of ENTCOST are -0.177 and -0.272, respectively. Both 
of them are significant at 1% level. The sign and figure of coefficients of other control 
variables in table 6 are similar with those in table 5. Table 6 provides the consistent 
results: (1) Firms make worse M&As when Diff is high. A high Diff means lower 
substitutability, that is, less competition; (2) Firms make worse M&As when MKTSIZE 
54 
is large (more competition); (3) Firms make better M&As when ENTCOST is high (less 
competition). 
<Insert Table 6 here> 
Table 7 shows the effect of being dominant firm on relation between product market 
competition and cumulative abnormal return. In column (1) the coefficient of Diffl is 
-2.369 and significant at 5% level; the coefficient of MKTSIZE is -0.214 and significant 
at 5% level; the coefficient of ENTCOST is 0.188 and significant at 5% level. The 
coefficient of interaction between Diff and Dominant is 7.008 and significant at 5% level. 
This suggests that dominant firms make good M&As when Diff is high. A high Diff 
means lower substitutability, that is, less competition. The coefficient of Dominant is 
-6.418 and significant at 10% level. This suggests that dominant firms are more likely to 
make worse M&As. In column (2) none of the coefficients of three PMC variables and 
the interactions between three PMC variables and Dominant is significant. Again, the 
sign and figure of coefficients of other control variables in table 7 are similar with those 
in table 5. 
<Insert Table 7 here> 
Table 8 also shows the effect of being dominant firm on relation between product 
market competition and cumulative abnormal return without CONC and the interactions 
between three PMC variables and Dominant. The coefficients of Dominant in all columns 
are positive and significant when I do not consider the interactions between three PMC 
variables and Dominant. In column (4) the coefficient of Diffl is -2.226 and significant at 
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5% level; the coefficient of MKTSIZE is -0.255 and significant at 1% level; the 
coefficient of ENTCOST is 0.193 and significant at 5% level. In column (3) and column 
(5), the coefficient of Diffl and Diff2 are both negative and significant. The sign and 
figure of coefficients of other control variables in table 8 are similar with those in table 5. 
<Insert Table 8 here> 
Table 9 also shows the effect of being dominant firm on relation between product 
market competition and cumulative abnormal return without CONC but with the 
interactions between three PMC variables and Dominant. Table 9 shows that the 
coefficient of the interaction between MKTSIZE and Dominant is 0.060 and significant 
at 10% level, the coefficient of the interaction between ENTCOST and Dominant is 
0.060 and significant at 1% level, and the coefficients of the interaction between Diff 
(both Diffl and Diff2) and Dominant are 0.687 and 0.931, respectively, and both are 
significant at 1% level. Again, the sign and figure of coefficients of other control 
variables in table 9 are similar with those in table 5. These results suggest that (1) 
Dominant firms make better M&As when Diff is high. A high Diff means lower 
substitutability, that is, less competition; (2) Dominant firms make better M&As when 
MKTSIZE is large (more competition); (3) Firms make better M&As when ENTCOST is 
high (less competition). 
<Insert Table 9 here> 
To summarize the results above, I find that the four-firm concentration ratio (labeled 
CONC) and Herfindhal index gives ambiguous measures of competition and thus not 
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reliable (as argued by Karuna, 2007). So using Diff, MKTSIZE, ENTCOST are more 
reliable. For acquirers, I find that (1) Firms make worse M&As when Diff is high. A high 
Diff means lower substitutability, that is, less competition; (2) Firms make better M&As 
when MKTSIZE is large (more competition); (3) Firms make better M&As when 
ENTCOST is high (less competition). There is no clear relation between competition and 
CAR. 
For dominant firms, I find that (1) Dominant firms make better M&As when Diff is 
high. A high Diff means lower substitutability, that is, less competition; (2) Dominant 
firms make better M&As when MKTSIZE is large (more competition); (3) Firms make 
better M&As when ENTCOST is high (less competition). There is no clear relation 
between competition and the reaction of Dominant firm through M&As. 
6.2 Robustness Check for CAR Model 
Table 10 provides the robustness check for relation between product market 
competition and cumulative abnormal return. Table 10 shows the results for the OLS 
regression conducted on equation (3) in chapter 5 and adding dominant firm dummy 
variable and the interaction variables of PMC and dominant firm dummy variables. 
However, for the dependent variable, I use the bidder's 5-day (-2, +2) cumulative 
abnormal returns instead of using the bidder's 2-day (0, +1) cumulative abnormal returns. 
In column (1) the coefficient of Diff 1 is -2.746 and significant at 5% level; the coefficient 
of MKTSIZE is -0.223 and significant at 10% level; the coefficient of ENTCOST is 
0.237 and significant at 5% level. In column (2) the coefficient of Diffl is -2.760 and 
significant at 5% level; the coefficient of MKTSIZE is -0.227 and significant at 10% 
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level; the coefficient of ENTCOST is 0.266 and significant at 5% level. The sign and 
figure of coefficients of other control variables in table 10 are similar with those in table 
5. Table 10 provides the consistent results that (1) Firms make worse M&As when Diff is 
high. A high Diff means lower substitutability, that is, less competition; (2) Firms make 
better M&As when MKTSIZE is large (more competition); (3) Firms make better M&As 
when ENTCOST is high (less competition). 
<Insert Table 10 here> 
6.3 The Results for Diversifying Acquisition Decision Model 
Table 11 provides the result for the logit regression conducted oh equation (4) in 
chapter 5. The dependent variable, diversifying acquisition, is a dummy variable which 
takes a value of 1 if bidder and target do not share the same SIC code at four-digit level, 0 
otherwise. In column (1), I only consider the control variables and do not consider the 
three PMC variables. The coefficient of Dominant is 0.136 and significant at 10% level. 
This suggests that for Dominant firms, the probability of making diversifying M&As is 
higher. The coefficient of Tobin's Q is -0.011 and significant at 5% level. For acquirers 
with high Tobin's Q the probability of making diversifying M&As is lower. The 
coefficients of free Cash Flow (FCF) and Liquidity are positive and significant. This 
suggests that for firms with more financial resources, the probability of making 
diversifying M&As is higher. The coefficient of Relative deal size is -0.127 and 
significant at 1% level. This means that when the relative deal size is large, the 
probability of making diversifying M&As is lower. In column (2), using the CONC to 
proxy competition, I find that the coefficient of CONC is 2.158 and significant at 1% 
58 
level. This suggests that the probability of acquirer making diversifying M&As is higher 
when CONC is high(less competition). In column(3) and column(4),the significant 
negative coefficient on DOMINANT means the probability of making diversifying 
M&As is lower after controlling for the effect of competition. This suggests that PMC 
has a disciplinary effect on managerial behavior. In column (3) the coefficient of Diffl is 
-1.507 and significant at 1% level; the coefficient of MKTSIZE is -0.205 and significant 
at 1% level; the coefficient of ENTCOST is 0.086 and significant at 1% level. The result 
suggests that (1) the probability of acquirer making diversifying M&As is lower when 
Diff is high. A high Diff means lower substitutability, that is, less competition; (2) the 
probability of acquirer making diversifying M&As is lower when MKTSIZE is large 
(more competition); (3) the probability of acquirer making diversifying M&As is higher 
when ENTCOST is high (less competition). In addition, most coefficients of High tech 
are positive and significant. This suggests that for the acquirers in high tech industries, 
the probability of acquirer making diversifying M&As is higher. Most coefficients of Log 
Total assets are positive and significant. This suggests that for the acquirers having larger 
firm size, the probability of acquirer making diversifying M&As is higher. 
<Insert Table 11 here> 
As I argue that the four-firm concentration ratio (labeled CONC) and Herfindhal 
index gives ambiguous measures of competition and thus not reliable, Table 12 provides 
the result for the logit regression conducted on equation (4) in chapter 5 without CONC. 
In column (4) the coefficient of Diffl is -1.942 and significant at 1% level; the coefficient 
of MKTSIZE is -0.314 and significant at 1% level; the coefficient of ENTCOST is 0.122 
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and significant at 1% level. The sign and figure of coefficients of mother control variables 
in table 12 are similar with those in table 11. 
<Insert Table 12 here> 
For three PMC variables, both results of table 11 and table 12 suggest that (1) the 
probability of acquirer making diversifying M&As is lower when DIFF is high. A high 
DIFF means lower substitutability, that is, less competition; (2) the probability of 
acquirer making diversifying M&As is lower when MKTSIZE is large (more 
competition); (3) the probability of acquirer making diversifying M&As is higher when is 
high (less competition). Again, there is no clear relation between competition and the 
bidder's choice of diversifying acquisition vs. non- diversifying acquisition 
6.4 The Results for Merger Premium Model 
Table 13 provides the result for the OLS regression conducted on equation (5) in 
chapter 5 without the interactions between three PMC variables and Dominant. None of 
the coefficients of three PMC variables is significant. The coefficients of bidders' 
Tobin's Q are positive and significant. This suggests that firms with larger value of 
Tobin's Q are more likely to pay more premiums. Lakonishok et al. (1994) suggest that 
glamour firms usually experience high past growth in cash flows and earnings, which 
could cause manager overconfidence. Dong et al. (2006) argue that firms with high 
market-to-book ratios are more likely to be overvalued. The result is also consistent with 
the information asymmetry hypothesis that glamour firm managers have more 
information and thus wish to convert these into real assets through M&As. However, the 
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coefficients of targets' Tobin's Q are negative and significant. This indicates that for 
glamour targets, acquirers would pay fewer premiums. The coefficients of targets' 
Leverage are positive and significant, which suggests that for targets with high leverage 
ratio, acquirers would pay more premiums. The coefficients of Diversifying acquisition 
are negative and significant. This means that when making diversifying acquisitions deals, 
acquirers would pay fewer premiums. 
<Insert Table 13 here> 
Table 14 provides the result for the OLS regression conducted on equation (5) in 
chapter 5 with the interactions between three PMC variables and Dominant. In column (6) 
the coefficient of Diff2 is 30.97 and significant at 1% level; the coefficient of MKTSIZE 
is -2.73 and significant at 5% level; the coefficient of ENTCOST is 4.799 and significant 
at 1% level. The coefficient of the interaction between MKTSIZE and Dominant is 6.819 
and significant at 10% level, the coefficient of the interaction between ENTCOST and 
Dominant is -18.894 and significant at 1% level, and the coefficients of the interaction 
between Diff (Diff2) and Dominant are -143.371 and significant at 1% level. The sign 
and figure of coefficients of other control variables in table 14 are similar with those in 
table 13. 
For acquirers, the results of column (6) generally show that greater product 
substitutability, greater market size and lower entry costs are associated with smaller 
premium, suggesting that competition is negatively related to merger premium. This 
supports hypothesis H4a that Acquiring firms in more competitive industries are less 
likely to overpay the acquisition premium for mergers and acquisitions. 
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However, for dominant firms, the results of column (6) generally show that the 
greater product substitutability, greater market size and lower entry costs are associated 
with greater premium, suggesting that competition is positively related to merger 
premium. This supports hypothesis H5b that Dominant acquiring firms (acquirers with 
more agency problems) in more competitive industries are more likely to overpay the 
acquisition premium for mergers and acquisitions. 
<Insert Table 14 here> 
Table 15 provides the result for the OLS regression conducted on equation (5) in 
chapter 5 without CONC and the interactions between three PMC variables and 
Dominant. None of the coefficients of three PMC variables is significant. The sign and 
figure of coefficients of other control variables in table 15 are similar with those in table 
13. 
<Insert Table 15 here> 
Table 16 provides the result for the OLS regression conducted on equation (5) in 
chapter 5 without CONC but with the interactions between three PMC variables and 
Dominant. In column (6) the coefficient of Diff2 is 31.059 and significant at 1% level; 
the coefficient of MKTSIZE is -2.76 and significant at 1% level; the coefficient of 
ENTCOST is 4.813 and significant at 1% level. The coefficient of the interaction 
between MKTSIZE and Dominant is 6.818 and significant at 10% level, the coefficient 
of the interaction between ENTCOST and Dominant is -18.893 and significant at 1% 
level, and the coefficients of the interaction between Diff (Diff2) and Dominant are 
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-143.511 and significant at 1% level. The sign and figure of coefficients of other control 
variables in table 16 are similar with those in table 14. Table 15 and table 16 provide 
consistent result for table 13 and table 14, respectively. 
<Insert Table 16 here> 
Table 17 provides the result for the OLS regression conducted on equation (5) in 
chapter 5 without CONC but with the interactions between three PMC variables and 
Dominant and the acquirer's CEO equity ownership. I want to investigate the effect of 
insider ownership on the merger premiums. In column (2) the coefficient of Diff2 is 
31.057 and significant at 1% level; the coefficient of MKTSIZE is -2.758 and significant 
at 1% level; the coefficient of ENTCOST is 4.804 and significant at 1% level. The 
coefficient of the interaction between MKTSIZE and Dominant is 6.827 and significant 
at 10% level, the coefficient of the interaction between ENTCOST and Dominant is 
-18.894 and significant at 1% level, and the coefficients of the interaction between Diff 
(Diff2) and Dominant are -143.33 and significant at 1% level. The sign and figure of 
coefficients of other control variables in table 17 are similar with those in table 14. These 
results are similar with those in table 14 and table 16. However, the coefficient of 
acquirer's CEO equity ownership is negative and not significant. This means that 
acquirer's CEO equity ownership has no impact on merger premiums. 
<Insert Table 17 here> 
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Chapter 7 
Conclusion 
Conventional models assume competition improves corporate efficiency as firms 
strive to outperform competitors. In the context of agency models, the link between 
competition and managerial behavior becomes fuzzy. Hart (1983) and Schmidt (1997) 
posit that competition reduces managerial slack. Scharfstein (1988) argues that 
competition might increase managerial shirking. Recent studies on the relation between 
managerial compensation and competition further document conflicting evidence. In this 
study, I examine the effects of product market competition on M&A empirically and 
deduce from the results how managers have behaved. The four investigations that I will 
conduct in this study include 
a) How do investors react to M&A announcements? 
b) What is the size of the premium paid? 
c) Do firms engage in diversifying M&A when facing competition? 
d) How do dominant firms behave in M&A? 
My initial results suggest that the definition of competition is critical in evaluating 
corporate mergers and acquisitions. Consistent with Karuna(2007), I find that the 
four-firm concentration ratio (labeled CONC) and Herfindhal index gives ambiguous 
measures of competition and thus not reliable. 
Using three new dimensions (product substitutability, market density, and entry cost) 
to measure competition, I find the manager's M&A decisions could have different 
implications across the three dimensions. I find that (1) Firms make worse M&As when 
DIFF is high. A high DIFF means lower substitutability, that is, less competition; (2) 
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Firms make better M&As when MKTSIZE is large (more competition); (3) Firms make 
better M&As when ENTCOST is high (less competition). Hence, there is no clear 
relation between competition and CAR. 
For dominant firms, I find that (1) Dominant firms make better M&As when DIFF is 
high. A high DIFF means lower substitutability, that is, less competition; (2) Dominant 
firms make better M&As when MKTSIZE is large (more competition); (3) Firms make 
better M&As when ENTCOST is high (less competition). There is no clear relation 
between competition and the reaction of Dominant firm through M&As. 
For the issue of the manager's propensity to diversify the firm when facing 
competition, my results suggest that there is no clear relation between competition and 
the bidder's choice of diversifying acquisition vs. non- diversifying acquisition 
Regarding acquisition premium, my results consistently show a negative relation 
between competition and the size of the premium. The results indicate that greater 
product substitutability, greater market size and lower entry costs are associated with 
smaller premium, suggesting that competition is negatively related to merger premium. 
This supports hypothesis H4a that acquiring firms in more competitive industries are less 
likely to overpay the acquisition premium for mergers and acquisitions. 
However, for dominant firms, the results indicate that the greater product 
substitutability, greater market size and lower entry costs are associated with greater 
premium, suggesting that competition is positively related to merger premium. This 
supports hypothesis H5b that dominant acquiring firms (acquirers with more agency 
problems) in more competitive industries are more likely to overpay the acquisition 
premium for mergers and acquisitions. This study contributes to the literature on mergers 
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and acquisitions by using new proxies for competition to examine the relation between 
CAR and competition, and the relation between merger premium and competition. In 
addition, this study also considers the effect of insider ownership. 
There are two limitations to this dissertation. First, I rely on Standard and Poor's 
primary industrial segment classification on WRDS to assign firms to industries. The 
primary industry could change during the sample period in this dissertation. Second, the 
use of price-cost margin variable assumes there is a one-to-one correspondence between 
four-digit sic codes and product markets. However, this correspondence is not perfect, as 
some industries may include several products that are not themselves close substitutes for 
each other. 
Future extension to this dissertation is to include other governance Mechanisms such 
as GIM index, BCF index, CEO equity-based pay, CEO/chairman duality, and board 
characteristics (board size and independent board). 
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Tablel 
Sample Distribution by Announcement Year 
Panel A provides the distribution of cumulative abnormal return sample. The sample consists of 5265 
completed U.S. merger and acquisitions (listed in SDC) between 1986 and 2006 made by public U.S. firms. 
Panel B provides the distribution of merger premium sample. The sample consists of 750 completed U.S. 
merger and acquisitions (listed in SDC) between 1987 and 2006 made by public U.S. firms. Variable 
definitions are in the table 4. All dollar items are CPI-adjusted to year-2006 dollars to adjust for the effect 
of inflation. 
Panel A: Cumulative abnormal return sample 
Year Number of 
Acquisitions 
Mean Acquirer Market 
Value of Equity ($mil) 
(Median) 
Mean Deal 
Value($mil) 
(Median) 
Mean 
Relative Size 
(Median) 
1986 
1987 
1988 
1989 
1990 
1991 
1992 
1993 
1994 
1995 
1996 
1997 
1 
8 
2 
3 
16 
45 
65 
92 
131 
240 
331 
493 
72 
(72) 
4920 
(770) 
545 
(545) 
12493 
(251) 
9970 
(1681) 
3405 
(798) 
2464 
(718) 
1423 
(577) 
2960 
(678) 
2080 
(471) 
4201 
(653) 
3609 
(545) 
123 
(123) 
89 
(55) 
23 
(23) 
805 
(223) 
306 
(108) 
163 
(40) 
99 
(27) 
111 
(24) 
201 
(38) 
172 
(36) 
419 
(42) 
215 
(36) 
1.71 
(1.71) 
0.08 
(0.07) 
0.05 
(0.05) 
0.37 
(0.06) 
0.07 
(0.06) 
0.21 
(0.05) 
0.11 
(0.06) 
0.12 
(0.06) 
0.18 
(0.07) 
0.21 
(0.07) 
0.22 
(0.06) 
0.19 
(0.08) 
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Table 1-Continued 
Panel A: Cumulative abnormal return sample-continued 
Year 
1998 
1999 
2000 
2001 
2002 
2003 
2004 
2005 
2006 
Total 
Number of 
Acquisitions 
520 
479 
438 
347 
338 
360 
433 
451 
472 
5265 
Mean Acquirer Market 
Value of Equity ($mil) 
(Median) 
5889 
(665) 
22220 
(1158) 
23444 
(1632) 
14115 
(1337) 
9497 
(1085) 
5552 
(746) 
8321 
(1018) 
9822 
(1111) 
9976 
(1204) 
9793 
(901) 
Mean Deal 
Value($mil) 
(Median) 
526 
(45) 
983 
(72) 
1030 
(65) 
585 
(52) 
358 
(47) 
210 
(57) 
414 
(53) 
729 
(58) 
607 
(60) 
519 
(50) 
Mean 
Relative Size 
(Median) 
0.19 
(0.08) 
0.22 
(0.06) 
0.22 
(0.05) 
0.18 
(0.06) 
0.16 
(0.04) 
0.19 
(0.08) 
0.21 
(0.06) 
0.18 
(0.06) 
0.16 
(0.05) 
0.19 
(0.06) 
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Table 1-Continued 
Panel B: Merger premium sample 
Year Number of Premium(%) Cash Stock Mixed 
Acquisitions (Median) 
1986 
1987 
1988 
1989 
1990 
1991 
1992 
1993 
1994 
1995 
1996 
1997 
1998 
1999 
2000 
2001 
2002 
2003 
2004 
2005 
2006 
Total 
0 
2 
1 
0 
4 
3 
2 
11 
11 
37 
50 
65 
82 
98 
57 
70 
31 
44 
52 
70 
60 
750 
0(0) 
33(33) 
115(115) 
0(0) 
66(56) 
69(88) 
42(42) 
44(36) 
63(46) 
41(39) 
42(34) 
42(36) 
54(48) 
51(47) 
51(39) 
43(44) 
49(41) 
45(32) 
30(27) 
38(29) 
36(33) 
45(37) 
0 
1 
0 
0 
3 
1 
1 
5 
0 
3 
5 
8 
11 
17 
12 
15 
12 
12 
21 
33 
42 
202 
0 
1 
1 
0 
1 
2 
0 
3 
9 
28 
36 
40 
51 
54 
27 
29 
11 
19 
17 
18 
10 
357 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
1 
3 
2 
6 
9 
17 
20 
27 
18 
26 
8 
13 
14 
19 
8 
191 
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Table 2 
Sample Distribution by Payment and Target Status 
Panel A provides the distribution of cumulative abnormal return sample. The sample consists of 5265 
completed U.S. merger and acquisitions (listed in SDC) between 1986 and 2006 made by public U.S. firms. 
Panel B provides the distribution of merger premium sample. The sample consists of 750completed U.S. 
merger and acquisitions (listed in SDC) between 1987 and 2006 made by public U.S. firms. Variable 
definitions are in the table 4. All dollar items are CPI-adjusted to year-2006 dollars to adjust for the effect 
of inflation.a, b ,c stand for statistical significance based on two-sided test at 1%, 5%, and 10% level, 
respectively. 
Panel A: Cumulative abnormal return 
Whole All Mixed All Public Private Subsidiary 
Sample Cash Stock Target Target Target 
CAR Mean 0.717a 0.997a 0.961a -0.083 -2.014a 1.214a 1.568a 
(0,+l) Median 0.253a 0.443a 0.256 -0.291 -1.269a 0.551a 0.559a 
a 
Number of 5265 2836 1098 1331 984 2711 1570 
obs. 
Panel B: Merger premium sample 
Whole All Mixed All Public Private Subsidiary 
Sample Cash Stock Target Target Target 
Premium (%) Mean 45a 45a 42a 46a 45a 0 46a 
Median 37a 37a 35a 39a 37a 0 46a 
Number of 750 202 191 357 748 0 2 
obs. 
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Table 3 
Summary Statistics 
Panel A provides the summary statistics of cumulative abnormal return sample. The sample consists of 
5265 completed U.S. merger and acquisitions (listed in SDC) between 1986 and 2006 made by public U.S. 
firms. Panel B provides the summary statistics of merger premium sample. The sample consists of 1286 
completed U.S. merger and acquisitions (listed in SDC) between 1986 and 2006 made by public U.S. firms. 
Variable definitions are in the table 4. All dollar items are CPI-adjusted to year-2006 dollars to adjust for 
the effect of inflation. 
Panel A: Cumulative abnormal return sample 
Variable Mean Median 25th 
Percentile 
75th 
Percentile 
St. Dev. 
CAR (Dependent Variable): 
CAR(0,+1) 0.717 0.253 -2.393 3.286 7.425 
Product Market Competition: 
Extent of product 
Substitutability 
(Diffl-diff2) 
Diffl 
Diff2 
Market Size($mil) 
Log Market 
Size(MKTSIZE) 
Entry Cost ($mil) 
Log Entry Cost 
(ENTCOST) 
Concentration 
ratio(CONC) 
1.161 
0.953 
67646.680 
10.008 
12194.242 
8.199 
0.669 
1.132 
0.962 
26461.923 
10.183 
3945.931 
8.280 
0.668 
1.086 
0.882 
7069.683 
8.864 
1132.137 
7.032 
0.473 
1.230 
1.041 
94379.929 
11.455 
12646.876 
9.445 
0.855 
0.116 
0.159 
102647.795 
1.806 
20450.566 
1.776 
0.219 
Bidder Characteristics: 
Total assets($mil) 
Log Total assets 
Market value of equity 
($mil) 
Tobin's Q 
Leverage 
Free Cash Flow (FCF) 
Liquidity 
Stock price runup 
3813.060 
6.438 
9793.158 
3.007 
0.847 
0.024 
0.284 
8.874 
539.138 
6.290 
900.912 
2.004 
0.206 
0.048 
0.255 
2.327 
159.479 
5.072 
274.804 
1.423 
0.002 
0.005 
0.104 
-12.843 
2200.337 
7.696 
3393.810 
3.136 
0.655 
0.087 
0.436 
20.655 
11059.763 
1.884 
38150.038 
3.832 
7.181 
0.141 
0.227 
47.543 
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Table 3-Continued 
Panel A: Cumulative abnormal return sample-continued 
Variable 
CEO equity ownership 
Block 
Dominant (dummy) 
Mean Median 25th 
Percentile 
6.214 1.003 0.192 
54.349 55.780 34.746 
0.070 0.000 0.000 
75th 
Percentile 
4.782 
73.338 
0.000 
St. Dev. 
23.484 
27.525 
0.256 
Deal Characteristics: 
Public (dummy) 
Private (dummy) 
Subsidiary (dummy) 
All Cash (dummy) 
Mixed (dummy) 
All Stock (dummy) 
Diversifying acquisition 
(dummy) 
High tech (dummy) 
Relative deal size 
0.187 
0.515 
0.298 
0.539 
0.209 
0.253 
0.650 
0.349 
0.192 
0.000 
1.000 
0.000 
1.000 
0.000 
0.000 
1.000 
0.000 
0.063 
0.000 
0.000 
0.000 
0.000 
0.000 
0.000 
0.000 
0.000 
0.020 
0.000 
1.000 
1.000 
1.000 
0.000 
1.000 
1.000 
1.000 
0.184 
0.390 
0.500 
0.458 
0.499 
0.406 
0.435 
0.477 
0.477 
0.401 
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Table 3-Continued 
Panel B: Merger premium sample 
Variable Mean Median 25th 
Percentile 
75th 
Percentile 
St. Dev. 
Premium (%) (Dependent Variable): 
Premium (%) 44.726 37.259 20.456 62.130 39.361 
Product Market Competition: 
Extent of product 
substitutability 
(DIFF1-DIFF2) 
Diffl 
Diff2 
Market Size($mil) 
Log Market 
Size(MKTSIZE) 
Entry Cost ($mil) 
Log Entry Cost 
(ENTCOST) 
Bidder Characteristics: 
Dominant 
Tobin's QA 
LeverageA 
Free Cash Flow (FCF) 
LiquidityA 
Target 
Characteristics: 
Tobin's Qx 
Leveragex 
Free Cash Flow (FCF) 
T 
Liquidityx 
1.176 
0.938 
91461.038 
10.370 
15164.164 
8.530 
0.097 
3.059 
1.164 
0.033 
0.231 
2.440 
1.416 
-0.037 
0.315 
1.157 
0.962 
33310.702 
10.414 
5618.576 
8.634 
0.000 
2.116 
0.323 
0.051 
0.197 
1.642 
0.129 
0.021 
0.305 
1.095 
0.860 
12569.209 
9.439 
1683.873 
7.429 
0.000 
1.479 
0.026 
0.010 
0.057 
1.225 
0.000 
-0.055 
0.098 
1.242 
1.038 
121663.274 
11.709 
16812.608 
9.730 
0.000 
3.130 
0.092 
0.092 
0.361 
2.669 
0.741 
0.063 
0.517 
0.115 
0.168 
131570.344 
1.785 
23241.205 
1.680 
0.297 
3.868 
12.630 
0.121 
0.216 
2.468 
18.215 
0.220 
0.253 
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Table 3-Continued 
Panel B: Merger premium sample -continued 
Variable Mean Median 25th 75th St. Dev. 
Percentile Percentile 
Deal Characteristics: 
Public (dummy) 0.997 1.000 1.000 1.000 0.052 
Private (dummy) 
Subsidiary (dummy) 
All Cash (dummy) 
Mixed (dummy) 
All Stock (dummy) 
Diversifying acquisition 
(dummy) 
Relative firm sizeA/T 
Relative deal size 
0.000 
0.003 
0.269 
0.255 
0.476 
0.593 
1.508 
0.385 
0.000 
0.000 
0.000 
0.000 
0.000 
1.000 
1.345 
0.178 
0.000 
0.000 
0.000 
0.000 
0.000 
0.000 
1.135 
0.045 
0.000 
0.000 
1.000 
1.000 
1.000 
1.000 
1.686 
0.517 
0.000 
0.052 
0.444 
0.436 
0.500 
0.492 
0.611 
0.521 
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Table 4 The definitions of variables 
Variable Method of calculation 
Panel A:Cumulative Abnormal Return and Merger Premium 
CAR(0,+1) 
Premium (%) 
Two-day cumulative abnormal return (in 
percentage) calculated by using the 
market model. The market model 
parameters are estimated over period 
(-275,-20) with the CRSP 
equally-weighted return as market index. 
The merger premium which is defined as 
four-week pre-announcement premium. It 
equals the difference between the initial 
bid price and the target price four weeks 
prior to the announcement divided by the 
same target price four weeks prior to the 
announcement 
Panel B : Product market competition 
Extent of product substitutability in 
industry (Diffl-DifE) (at four-digit SIC 
code level) 
Opcostl=sum of data41, datal89, datal4 
anddatal74 
Opcost2=sum of data41, datal89,and 
datal96 
Level of market size in industry (at 
four-digit SIC code level) 
Level of entry costs in industry (at 
four-digit SIC code level) 
Four-firm concentration ratio in industry 
(at four-digit SIC code level) 
it is equal to sales/operating costs, for 
each industrial segment; operating costs 
include cost of goods sold, selling, 
general, and administrative expense, and 
depreciation, depletion, and amortization 
Natural log of industry sales (industry 
sales is computed as the sum of segment 
sales for firms operating in the industry) 
Level of entry costs in industry is equal to 
natural log of weighted average of gross 
value of cost of property, plant and 
equipment for firms in industry, weighted 
by each firm's market share in industry 
Proportion of sales in the industry 
accounted for by the four largest firms 
(by sales) in the industry (industry sales is 
as computed in MKTSIZE above) 
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Table 4- Continued 
Panel C:Firm Characteristics 
Variable 
Dominant firm 
Firm size (Log Total assets) 
Tobin's q 
Market value of equity 
Leverage 
Free cash flow 
Liquidity 
Stock price runup 
CEO equity ownership 
BLOCK 
Method of calculation 
Dummy variable: 1 for the firm having the largest 
market share at time t in a four-digit SIC industry, 0 
otherwise. 
Log of book value of total assets (item6). 
Market value of assets over book value of assets: 
(item6-item60 + item25 * iteml99)/item6. 
Number of shares outstanding multiplied by Calendar 
year end close price 
the ratio of debt to equity (COMPUSTAT items 9/60) 
Operating income before depreciation (iteml3) -
interest expenses (iteml5) - income taxes (iteml6) -
capital expenditures (iteml28), scaled by book value of 
total assets (item6). 
The net liquidity to total assets(item(4-5)/6) (Gaspar et 
al., 2005) 
Bidder's buy-and-hold abnormal return (BHAR) during 
the period (-130, -31). The market index is the CRSP 
value-weighted return. 
TOP 5 executives' percentage ownership of the firm 
Fraction of bidder's common stock held by bidder's 
institutional blockholder 
Panel D: Deal Characteristics 
Public target 
Private target 
Subsidiary target 
All cash 
All stock 
Mixed 
Diversifying acquisition 
High tech 
Relative deal size 
Dummy variable: 1 for Public targets, 0 otherwise. 
Dummy variable: 1 for Private targets, 0 otherwise. 
Dummy variable: 1 for Subsidiary targets, 0 otherwise. 
Dummy variable: 1 for deals all cash-financed, 0 
otherwise. 
Dummy variable: 1 for deals all stock-financed, 0 
otherwise. 
Dummy variable: 1 for deals mixed-financed, 0 
otherwise. 
Dummy variable: 1 if bidder and target do not share the 
same four-digit SIC code, 0 otherwise. 
Dummy variable: 1 if bidders are from high tech 
industries defined by Loughran and Ritter(2004), 0 
otherwise. 
Deal value (from SDC) over bidder market value of 
equity defined above. 
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Table 5 
The Relation between Product Market Competition and Cumulative Abnormal 
Return 
The sample consists of 5265 completed U.S. merger and acquisitions (listed in SDC) between 1986 and 
2006 made by public U.S. firms. The dependent variable is the bidder's 2-day (0,+l) cumulate abnormal 
return in percentage points. Variable definitions are in the table 4. All dollar items are CPI-adjusted to 
year-2006 dollars to adjust for the effect of inflation. In parentheses are t-statistics based on standard errors 
adjusted for heteroskedasticity (White(1980)) .a , b ,c stand for statistical significance based on two-sided 
test at 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. All regressions control for year fixed effects, whose coefficient 
estimates are suppressed. 
Diffl Diff2 
Variable (D (2) (3) (4> (5) 
Product Market Competition: 
Diff 
Log Market Size(MKTSIZE) 
Log Entry Cost (ENTCOST) 
Concentration ratio(CONC) 
Herfmdahl index 
Bidder Characteristics: 
Log Total assets 
Tobin's Q 
Leverage 
Free Cash Flow (FCF) 
Liquidity 
1.544a 
(3.305) 
.559a 
-2.082b 
(-2.100) 
-0.227b 
(-2.238) 
0.165° 
(1.930) 
0.468 
(0.728) 
-1.198 
(-1.502) 
-0.170 
(-1.560) 
0.078 
(0.766) 
0.971 
(1.553) 
(3.359) 
-0.302a 
(-3.995) 
-0.030 
(-0.719) 
-0.023b 
(-2.215) 
-0.015 
(-0.014) 
0.122 
(0.179) 
-0.2893 
(-3.789) 
-0.026 
(-0.628) 
-0.024b 
(-2.231) 
-0.269 
(-0.262) 
0.117 
(0.173) 
-0.284a 
(-3.715) , 
-0.024 
(-0.573) 
-0.024b 
(-2.303) 
-0.356 
(-0.346) 
0.095 
(0.140) 
-0.281a 
(-3.595) 
-0.023 
(-0.555) 
-0.025b 
(-2.368) 
-0.242 
(-0.234) 
0.147 
(0.214) 
-0.2863 
(-3.667) 
-0.023 
(-0.556) 
-0.025b 
(-2.374) 
-0.237 
(-0.229) 
0.218 
(0.319) 
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Table 5-Continued 
Variable 
Stock price runup 
CEO equity ownership 
Block 
Deal Characteristics: 
High tech 
Public target x all cash deal 
Private target x all cash deal 
Subsidiary target x all cash deal 
Public target x all stock deal 
Private target x all stock deal 
Subsidiary target x all stock deal 
Relative deal size 
Diversifying acquisition 
Intercept 
Adjusted-R2 
F-statistic 
P-value 
Number of obs. 
(1) 
-0.004 
(-1.159) 
0.000 
(0.136) 
-0.009c 
(-1.922) 
-0.5983 
(-2.516) 
0.132 
(0.326) 
0.314 
(0.957) 
0.9483 
(2.964) 
-3.368a 
(-6.988) 
1.065b 
(2.360) 
0.234 
(0.248) 
1.634a 
(3.027) 
-0.020 
(-0.095) 
10.4663 
(8.169) 
4.1% 
7.065 
0.000 
5265 
(2) 
-0.004 
(-1.170) 
0.000 
(0.153) 
-0.009 
(-1.977) 
-0.387 
(-1.565) 
0.115 
(0.284) 
0.281 
(0.859) 
0.940a 
(2.945) 
-3.375a 
(-7.010) 
1.0366 
(2.299) 
0.146 
(0.155) 
1.645a 
(3.060) 
-0.121 
(-0.568) 
10.302a 
(8.029) 
4.2% 
7.131 
0.000 
5265 
(3) 
-0.004 
(-1.213) 
0.001 
(0.183) 
-0.009b 
(-2.040) 
-0.386 
(-1.578) 
0.085 
(0.209) 
0.284 
(0.867) 
0.925a 
(2.894) 
-3.366a 
(-6.994) 
1.038b 
(2.305) 
0.145 
(0.153) 
1.637a 
(3.049) 
-0.153 
(-0.716) 
9.838a 
(7.546) 
4.2% 
7.140 
0.000 
5265 
Diffl 
(4) 
-0.004 
(-1.214) 
0.000 
(0.130) 
-0.009 
(-1.887) 
-0.307 
(-1.248) 
0.135 
(0.332) 
0.276 
(0.841) 
0.887a 
(2.774) 
-3.3173 
(-6.917) 
1.080b 
(2.398) 
0.122 
(0.129) 
1.608a 
(2.994) 
-0.225 
(-1.046) 
13.5363 
(6.506) 
4.4% 
6.863 
0.000 
5265 
Diff2 
(5) 
-0.004 
(-1.253) 
0.001 
(0.207) 
-0.008° 
(-1.870) 
-0.229 
(-0.899) 
0.131 
(0.321) 
0.282 
(0.860) 
0.897a 
(2.811) 
-3.337a 
(-6.955) 
1.071b 
(2.376) 
0.123 
(0.131) 
1.6093 
(2.991) 
-0.200 
(-0.931) 
12.3253 
(6.879) 
4.3% 
6.795 
0.000 
5265 
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Table 6 
The Relation between Product Market Competition and Cumulative 
Abnormal Return (without CONC) 
The sample consists of 5265 completed U.S. merger and acquisitions (listed in SDC) between 1986 and 
2006 made by public U.S. firms. The dependent variable is the bidder's 2-day (0,+l) cumulate abnormal 
return in percentage points. Variable definitions are in the Table 4. All dollar items are CPI-adjusted to 
year-2006 dollars to adjust for the effect of inflation. In parentheses are t-statistics based on standard errors 
adjusted for heteroskedasticity (White(1980)) .a, b ,c stand for statistical significance based on two-sided 
test at 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. All regressions control for year fixed effects, whose coefficient 
estimates are suppressed. 
Diffl Diff2 
Variable 
Product Market 
Competition: 
Diff 
Log Market 
Size(MKTSIZE) 
Log Entry Cost 
(ENTCOST) 
Bidder Characteristics: 
Log Total assets 
Tobin's Q 
Leverage 
Free Cash Flow (FCF) 
Liquidity 
Stock price runup 
CEO equity ownership 
(1) 
-0.177a 
(-2.941) 
-0.2573 
(-3.266) 
-0.027 
(-0.641) 
-0.024b 
(-2.286) 
-0.263 
(-0.254) 
0.137 
(0.202) 
-0.004 
(-1.153) 
0.000 
(0.073) 
(2) 
-0.024 
(-0.394) 
-0.2973 
(-3.841) 
-0.029 
(-0.710) 
-0.023b 
(-2.216) 
-0.050 
(-0.048) 
0.111 
(0.163) 
-0.004 
(-1.148) 
0.000 
(0.119) 
(3) 
-2.778a 
(-2.938) 
-0.306a 
(-4.054) 
-0.025 
(-0.605) 
-0.023b 
(-2.272) 
-0.076 
(-0.075) 
0.040 
(0.058) 
-0.003 
(-1.110) 
0.000 
(0.056) 
(4) 
-2.240b 
(-2.374) 
-0.2693 
(-3.288) 
0.179b 
(2.126) 
-0.2803 
(-3.569) 
-0.024 
(-0.580) 
-0.025b 
(-2.363) 
-0.182 
(-0.176) 
0.160 
(0.234) 
-0.004 
(-1.200) 
0.000 
(0.106) 
(5) 
-1.318b 
(-1.990) 
-0.324 
(-4.302) 
-0.029 
(-0.689) 
-0.023b 
(-2.256) 
0.113 
(0.110) 
0.191 
(0.280) 
-0.004 
(-1.188) 
0.001 
(0.185) 
(6) 
-0.998 
(-1.282) 
-0.2723 
(-3.152) 
0.121 
(1.225) 
-0.2783 
(-3.563) 
-0.026 
(-0.625) 
-0.025b 
(-2.353) 
-0.123 
(-0.119) 
0.253 
(0.370) 
-0.004 
(-1.232) 
0.001 
(0.165) 
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Table 6-Contmued 
Diffl Diff2 
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Block 
Deal Characteristics: 
High tech 
Public target x all cash deal 
Private target x all cash 
deal 
Subsidiary target x all cash 
deal 
Public target x all stock 
deal 
Private target x all stock 
deal 
Subsidiary target x all 
stock deal 
Relative deal size 
Diversifying acquisition 
Intercept 
Adjusted-R2 
F-statistic 
P -value 
Number of obs. 
-0.009b 
(-2.064) 
-0.388 
(-1.588) 
0.098 
(0.243) 
0.281 
(0.855) 
0.936a 
(2.926) 
-3.359a 
(-6.980) 
1.062b 
(2.353) 
0.198 
(0.209) 
1.644a 
(3.056) 
-0.128 
(-0.599) 
12.157 
(8.772) 
4.2% 
7.099 
0.000 
5265 
-0.009c 
(-1.946) 
-0.587b 
(-2.465) 
0.125 
(0.307) 
0.310 
(0.942) 
0.950a 
(2.971) 
-3.368a 
(-6.986) 
1.062b 
(2.351) 
0.238 
(0.251) 
1.637a 
(3.032) 
-0.026 
(-0.125) 
10.646a 
(7.804) 
4.1% 
6.882 
0.000 
5265 
-0.008c 
(-1.876) 
-0.553b 
(-2.305) 
0.148 
(0.365) 
0.295 
(0.898) 
0.911a 
(2.837) 
-3.3123 
(-6.893) 
1.071b 
(2.374) 
0.212 
(0.225) 
1.614a 
(2.990) 
-0.113 
(-0.536) 
13.573a 
(7.970) 
4.2% 
7.140 
0.000 
5265 
-0.008c 
(-1.873) 
-0.325 
(-1.320) 
0.146 
(0.359) 
0.278 
(0.848) 
0.889a 
(2.777) 
-3.312a 
(-6.909) 
1.090b 
(2.413) 
0.138 
(0.146) 
1.606a 
(2.990) 
-0.213 
(-0.987) 
14.2093 
(8.171) 
4.4% 
7.023 
0.000 
5265 
-0.008c 
(-1.740) 
-0.520b 
(-2.134) 
0.174 
(0.426) 
0.320 
(0.974) 
0.926a 
(2.897) 
-3.342a 
(-6.947) 
1.082b 
(2.397) 
0.224 
(0.237) 
1.606a 
(2.966) 
-0.035 
(-0.166) 
11.806a 
(8.138) 
4.1% 
6.982 
0.000 
5265 
-0.008c 
(-1.850) 
-0.273 
(-1.081) 
0.147 
(0.362) 
0.288 
(0.877) 
0.906a 
(2.836) 
-3.337a 
(-6.954) 
1.090b 
(2.413) 
0.155 
(0.163) 
1.610a 
(2.990) 
-0.166 
(-0.771) 
13.175a 
(7.764) 
4.3% 
6.909 
0.000 
5265 
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Table 7 
The Effect of being Dominant firm on the Relation between Product Market 
Competition and Cumulative Abnormal Return 
The sample consists of 5265 completed U.S. merger and acquisitions (listed in SDC) between 1986 and 
2006 made by public U.S. firms. The dependent variable is the bidder's 2-day (0,+l) cumulate abnormal 
return in percentage points.Variable definitions are in the Table 4. All dollar items are CPI-adjusted to 
year-2006 dollars to adjust for the effect of inflation. In parentheses are t-statistics based on standard errors 
adjusted for heteroskedasticity (White(1980)) . a, b, c stand for statistical significance based on two-sided 
test at 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. All regressions control for year fixed effects, whose coefficient 
estimates are suppressed. 
Diffl Diff2 
Variable (1) (2) 
Product Market Competition: 
Diff 
Log Market Size(MKTSIZE) 
Log Entry Cost (ENTCOST) 
Concentration ratio(CONC) 
Diff2 x Dominant 
Log Market Size(MKTSIZE) x Dominant 
Log Entry Cost (ENTCOST) x Dominant 
Bidder Characteristics: 
Dominant 
Log Total assets 
Tobin's Q 
Leverage 
Free Cash Flow (FCF) 
-2.369b 
(-2.312) 
-0.214b 
(-2.079) 
0.188b 
(2.107) 
0.388 
(0.595) 
7.008b 
(2.378) 
0.130 
(0.529) 
-0.289 
(-1.199) 
-6.418C 
(-1.654) 
-0.305a 
(-3.723) 
-0.025 
(-0.598) 
-0.025a 
(-2.358) 
-0.249 
(-0.240) 
-1.229 
(-1.498) 
-0.168 
(-1.504) 
0.102 
(0.950) 
0.874 
(1.379) 
1.694 
(0.537) 
0.043 
(0.175) 
-0.101 
(-0.370) 
-0.704 
(-0.177) 
-0.3073 
(-3.756) 
-0.024 
(-0.577) 
-0.025b 
(-2.364) 
-0.211 
(-0.203) 
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Table 7-Continued 
Diffl Diff2 
Variable 
Liquidity 
Stock price runup 
CEO equity ownership 
Block 
Deal Characteristics: 
High tech 
Public target x all cash deal 
Private target x all cash deal 
Subsidiary target x all cash deal 
Public target x all stock deal 
Private target x all stock deal 
Subsidiary target x all stock deal 
Relative deal size 
Diversifying acquisition 
Intercept 
Adjusted-R 
F-statistic 
P-value 
Number of obs. 
(1) 
0.112 
(0.163) 
-0.004 
(-1.214) 
0.000 
(0.133) 
-0.008c 
(-1.864) 
-0.291 
(-1.180) 
0.139 
(0.343) 
0.266 
(0.811) 
0.892a 
(2.790) 
-3.316a 
(-6.915) 
1.092b 
(2.424) 
0.138 
(0.146) 
1.619a 
(3.017) 
-0.217 
(-1.009) 
13.658a 
(6.483) 
4.3% 
6.359 
0.000 
5265 
(2) 
0.203 
(0.298) 
-0.004 
(-1.263) 
0.001 
(0.229) 
-0.008c 
(-1.863) 
-0.211 
(-0.825) 
0.139 
(0.342) 
0.278 
(0.847) 
0.899a 
(2.809) 
-3.348a 
(-6.975) 
1.077b 
(2.387) 
0.132 
(0.139) 
1.618a 
(3.008) 
-0.190 
(-0.888) 
12.262 
(6.720) 
4.3% 
6.245 
0.000 
5265 
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Table 8 
The Effect of being Dominant firm on the Relation between Product Market 
Competition and Cumulative Abnormal Return (without CONC) 
The sample consists of 5265 completed U.S. merger and acquisitions (listed in SDC) between 1986 and 
2006 made by public U.S. firms. The dependent variable is the bidder's 2-day (0,+ l) cumulate abnormal 
return in percentage points.Variable definitions are in the Table 4. All dollar items are CPTadjusted to 
year-2006 dollars to adjust for the effect of inflation. In parentheses are t-statistics based on standard errors 
adjusted for heteroskedasticity (White(1980)).a, b ,c stand for statistical significance based on two-sided 
test at 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. All regressions control for year fixed effects, whose coefficient 
estimates are suppressed. 
Diffl 
Variable 
Product Market Competition: 
Diff 
Log Market Size(MKTSIZE) 
Log Entry Cost (ENTCOST) 
(1) 
-0.156a 
(-2.523) 
(2) 
0.006 
(0.097) 
(3) 
-2.680a 
(-2.831 
(4) 
-2.226b 
(-2.360) 
-0.255a 
(-3.102) 
0.193b 
(2.284) 
Diff x Dominant 
Log Market Size(MKTSIZE) x Dominant 
Log Entry Cost (ENTCOST) x Dominant 
Bidder Characteristics: 
Dominant 
Log Total assets 
Tobin's Q 
Leverage 
Free Cash Flow (FCF) 
0.553c 
(1.791) 
-0.278a 
(-3.434) 
-0.027 
(-0.642) 
-0.024b 
(-2.272) 
-0.252 
(-0.244) 
0.813a 
(2.625) 
-0.3273 
(-4.130) 
-0.030 
(-0.712) 
-0.023b 
(-2.207) 
-0.034 
(-0.033) 
0.731b 
(2.415) 
-0.327a 
(-4.258) 
-0.025 
(-0.599) 
-0.023b 
(-2.263) 
-0.099 
(-0.097) 
0.651b 
(2.093) 
-0.305a 
(-3.784) 
-0.024 
(-0.584) 
-0.025b 
(-2.349) 
-0.163 
(-0.158) 
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Table 8-Continued 
Diffl 
Variable 
Liquidity 
Stock price runup 
CEO equity ownership 
Block 
Deal Characteristics: 
High tech 
Public target x all cash deal 
Private target x all cash deal 
Subsidiary target x all cash deal 
Public target x all stock deal 
Private target x all stock deal 
Subsidiary target x all stock deal 
Relative deal size 
Diversifying acquisition 
Intercept 
Adjusted-R 
F-statistic 
P-value 
Number of obs. 
(1) 
0.115 
(0.170) 
-0.004 
(-1.163) 
0.000 
(0.083) 
-0.009b 
(-2.054) 
-0.379 
(-1.547) 
0.095 
(0.237) 
0.279 
(0.849) 
0.934a 
(2.920) 
-3.375a 
(-7.013) 
1.063b 
(2.357) 
0.209 
(0.220) 
1.654a 
(3.073) 
-0.123 
(-0.572) 
12.032a 
(8.655) 
4.2% 
6.963 
0.000 
5265 
(2) 
0.096 
(0.140) 
-0.004 
(-1.176) 
0.000 
(0.144) 
-0.009c 
(-1.917) 
-0.551b 
(-2.297) 
0.124 
(0.306) 
0.306 
(0.931) 
0.943a 
(2.951) 
-3.389a 
(-7.036) 
1.068b 
(2.364) 
0.243 
(0.257) 
1.650a 
(3.056) 
-0.029 
(-0.137) 
10.533a 
(7.708) 
4.3% 
6.245 
0.000 
5265 
(3) 
0.016 
(0.024) 
-0.003 
(-1.124) 
0.000 
(0.062) 
-0.008c 
(-1.885) 
-0.509b 
(-2.108) 
0.139 
(0.343) 
0.287 
(0.876) 
0.907a 
(2.827) 
-3.333a 
(-6.936) 
1.073b 
(2.377) 
0.222 
(0.235) 
1.630a 
(3.019) 
-0.119 
(-0.565) 
13.5643 
(7.968) 
4.3% 
7.043 
0.000 
5265 
(4) 
0.142 
(0.208) 
-0.004 
(-1.218) 
0.000 
(0.125) 
-0.008c 
(-1.851) 
-0.308 
(-1.249) 
0.145 
(0.358) 
0.276 
(0.842) 
0.884a 
(2.766) 
-3.330a 
(-6.949) 
1.094b 
(2.421) 
0.147 
(0.155) 
1.617a 
(3.009) 
-0.208 
(-0.966) 
14.040a 
(8.047) 
4.4% 
6.911 
0.000 
5265 
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Table 8-Continued 
Diff x Dominant 
Log Market Size(MKTSIZE) x Dominant 
Log Entry Cost (ENTCOST) x Dominant 
Bidder Characteristics: 
Dominant 
Log Total assets 
Tobin's Q 
Leverage 
Free Cash Flow (FCF) 
Diff2 
Variable (5) (6) 
Product Market Competition: 
Diff -1.467b -1.032 
(8.319) (-1.326) 
Log Market Size(MKTSIZE) -0.256a 
(-2.945) 
Log Entry Cost (ENTCOST) 0.134 
(1.350) 
0.891a 
(2.925) 
-0.352a 
(-4.590) 
-0.028 
(-0.674) 
-0.023b 
(-2.252) 
0.097 
(0.094) 
0.675b 
(2.168) 
-0.3053 
(-3.793) 
-0.026 
(-0.628) 
-0.025b 
(-2.339) 
-0.101 
(-0.098) 
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Table 8-Continued 
Diff2 
Variable 
Liquidity 
Stock price runup 
CEO equity ownership 
Block 
Deal Characteristics: 
High tech 
Public target x all cash deal 
Private target x all cash deal 
Subsidiary target x all cash deal 
Public target x all stock deal 
Private target x all stock deal 
Subsidiary target x all stock deal 
Relative deal size 
Diversifying acquisition 
Intercept 
Adjusted-R 
F-statistic 
P-value 
Number of obs. 
(5) 
0.167 
(0.245) 
-0.004 
(-1.205) 
0.001 
(0.194) 
-0.008c 
(-1.731) 
-0.456c 
(-1.850) 
0.168 
(0.413) 
0.311 
(0.947) 
0.918a 
(2.872) 
-3.363a 
(-6.993) 
1.086b 
(2.406) 
0.234 
(0.247) 
1.622a 
(2.996) 
-0.048 
(-0.229) 
12.0803 
(8.319) 
4.2% 
6.930 
0.000 
5265 
(6) 
0.235 
(0.343) 
-0.004 
(-1.249) 
0.001 
(0.184) 
-0.008c 
(-1.824) 
-0.254 
(-1.004) 
0.147 
(0.363) 
0.286 
(0.871) 
0.901a 
(2.823) 
-3.355a 
(-6.996) 
1.094b 
(2.422) 
0.164 
(0.173) 
1.621 
(3.010) 
-0.161 
(-0.752) 
13.052a 
(7.685) 
4.3% 
6.805 
0.000 
5265 
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Table 9 
The Effect of being Dominant firm on the Relation between Product Market 
Competition and Cumulate Abnormal Return (without CONC and Dominant) 
The sample consists of 5265 completed U.S. merger and acquisitions (listed in SDC) between 1986 and 
2006 made by public U.S. firms. The dependent variable is the bidder's 2-day (0,+l) cumulate abnormal 
return in percentage points. Variable definitions are in the Table 4. All dollar items are CPI-adjusted to 
year-2006 dollars to adjust for the effect of inflation. In parentheses are t-statistics based on standard errors 
adjusted for heteroskedasticity (White(1980)).a, b ,c stand for statistical significance based on two-sided 
test at 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. All regressions control for year fixed effects, whose coefficient 
estimates are suppressed. 
Diffl 
Variable 
Product Market Competition: 
Diff 
Log Market Size(MKTSIZE) 
Log Entry Cost (ENTCOST) 
Diff x Dominant 
Log Market Size(MKTSIZE) x Dominant 
Log Entry Cost (ENTCOST) x Dominant 
(1) 
-0.162a 
(-2.631) 
0.060c 
(1.845) 
(2) 
-0.005 
(-0.086) 
0.100a 
(2.537) 
(3) 
-2.702a 
(-2.857) 
0.687a 
(2.626) 
(4) 
-2.311b 
(-2.408) 
-0.2493 
(-2.925) 
0.203b 
(2.313) 
1.895 
(1.364) 
-0.023 
(-0.105) 
-0.181 
(-0.742) 
Bidder Characteristics: 
Dominant 
Log Total assets 
Tobin's Q 
Leverage 
Free Cash Flow (FCF) 
-0.2803 
(-3.428) 
-0.027 
(-0.641) 
-0.024b 
(-2.271) 
-0.253 
(-0.245) 
-0.3273 
(-4.101) 
-0.029 
(-0.705) 
-0.023b 
(-2.204) 
-0.036 
(-0.034) 
-0.3293 
(-4.282) 
-0.025 
(-0.600) 
-0.023b 
(-2.262) 
-0.104 
(-0.101) 
-0.298a 
(-3.656) 
-0.025 
(-0.601) 
-0.025b 
(-2.355) 
-0.171 
(-0.165) 
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Table 9-Continued 
Diffl 
Variable 
Liquidity 
Stock price runup 
CEO equity ownership 
Block 
Deal Characteristics: 
High tech 
Public target x all cash deal 
Private target x all cash deal 
Subsidiary target x all cash deal 
Public target x all stock deal 
Private target x all stock deal 
Subsidiary target x all stock deal 
Relative deal size 
Diversifying acquisition 
Intercept 
Adjusted-R 
F-statistic 
P-value 
Number of obs. 
(1) 
0.116 
(0.171) 
-0.004 
(-1.165) 
0.000 
(0.081) 
-0.009b 
(-2.043) 
-0.381 
(-1.555) 
0.093 
(0.231) 
0.281 
(0.856) 
0.936a 
(2.926) 
-3.376a 
(-7.014) 
1.064b 
(2.359) 
0.207 
(0.219) 
1.655a 
(3.075) 
-0.125 
(-0.582) 
12.093a 
(8.720) 
4.2% 
6.958 
0.000 
5265 
(2) 
0.096 
(0.141) 
-0.004 
(-1.175) 
0.000 
(0.132) 
-0.009c 
(-1.900) 
-0.559b 
(-2.337) 
0.120 
(0.295) 
0.311 
(0.944) 
0.946a 
(2.961) 
-3.3903 
(-7.035) 
1.069b 
(2.366) 
0.247 
(0.260) 
1.651a 
(3.058) 
-0.032 
(-0.151) 
10.627a 
(7.793) 
4.1% 
6.782 
0.000 
5265 
(3) 
0.013 
(0.019) 
-0.003 
(-1.124) 
0.000 
(0.060) 
-0.008c 
(-1.883) 
-0.505b 
(-2.093) 
0.138 
(0.341) 
0.287 
(0.874) 
0.908a 
(2.829) 
-3.333a 
(-6.937) 
1.074b 
(2.379) 
0.223 
(0.237) 
1.632a 
(3.022) 
-0.120 
(-0.571) 
13.595a 
(7.989) 
4.3% 
7.055 
0.000 
5265 
(4) 
0.138 
(0.201) 
-0.004 
(-1.206) 
0.000 
(0.134) 
-0.008c 
(-1.881) 
-0.303 
(-1.225) 
0.153 
(0.378) 
0.268 
(0.816) 
0.882a 
(2.758) 
-3.319a 
(-6.919) 
1.093b 
(2.419) 
0.145 
(0.153) 
1.613a 
(3.003) 
-0.202 
(-0.939) 
13.953a 
(7.985) 
4.4% 
6.616 
0.000 
5265 
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Table 9-Continued 
Diff2 Diffl Diff2 
Variable 
Product Market Competition: 
Diff 
Log Market Size(MKTSIZE) 
Log Entry Cost (ENTCOST) 
Diff x Dominant 
Log Market Size(MKTSIZE) x Dominant 
Log Entry Cost (ENTCOST) x Dominant 
Bidder Characteristics: 
Dominant 
Log Total assets 
Tobin's Q 
Leverage 
Free Cash Flow (FCF) 
(5) 
-1.497b 
(-2.241) 
0.93 la 
(3.025) 
-0.3523 
(-4.601) 
-0.028 
(-0.677) 
-0.023b 
(-2.253) 
0.096 
(0.093) 
(6) 
-1.030 
(-1.312) 
-0.259a 
(-2.881) 
0.143 
(1.391) 
1.070 
(0.763) 
0.056 
(0.230) 
-0.122 
(-0.522) 
-0.302a 
(-3.705) 
-0.027 
(-0.639) 
-0.025b 
(-2.343) 
-0.106 
(-0.102) 
(7) 
-2.497a 
(-2.551) 
-0.249a 
(-2.933) 
0.200b 
(2.270) 
6.958b 
(2.359) 
0.126 
(0.516) 
-0.279 
(-1.164) 
-6.373° 
(-1.642) 
-0.305a 
(-3.721) 
-0.026 
(-0.618) 
-0.025b 
(-2.353) 
-0.198 
(-0.191) 
(8) 
-1.051 
(-1.311) 
-0.259a 
(-2.879) 
0.142 
(1.361) 
1.562 
(0.496) 
0.053 
(0.219) 
-0.101 
(-0.370) 
-0.602 
(-0.151) 
-0.303a 
(-3.702) 
-0.027 
(-0.639) 
-0.025b 
(-2.343) 
-0.106 
(-0.102) 
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Table 9-Continued 
Variable 
Liquidity 
Stock price runup 
CEO equity ownership 
Block 
Deal Characteristics: 
High tech 
Public target x all cash deal 
Private target x all cash deal 
Subsidiary target x all cash deal 
Public target x all stock deal 
Private target x all stock deal 
Subsidiary target x all stock deal 
Relative deal size 
Diversifying acquisition 
Intercept 
Adjusted-R 
F-statistic 
P-value 
Number of obs. 
Diff2 
(5) 
0.165 
(0.243) 
-0.004 
(-1.205) 
0.001 
(0.196) 
-0.008c 
(-1.737) 
-0.452c 
(-1.834) 
0.171 
(0.420) 
0.310 
(0.946) 
0.921a 
(2.881) 
-3.362a 
(-6.993) 
1.087b 
(2.408) 
0.235 
(0.248) 
1.623a 
(2.998) 
-0.048 
(-0.230) 
12.1083 
(8.339) 
4.2% 
6.936 
0.000 
5265 
(6) 
0.233 
(0.341) 
-0.004 
(-1.246) 
0.001 
(0.194) 
-0.008c 
(-1.843) 
-0.250 
(-0.988) 
0.152 
(0.375) 
0.283 
(0.863) 
0.904a 
(2.831) 
-3.3513 
(-6.980) 
1.093b 
(2.420) 
0.160 
(0.168) 
1.620a 
(3.009) 
-0.159 
(-0.738) 
12.9903 
(7.590) 
4.3% 
6.495 
0.000 
5265 
Diffl 
(7) 
0.122 
(0.178) 
-0.004 
(-1.204) 
0.000 
(0.113) 
-0.008c 
(-1.853) 
-0.305 
(-1.236) 
0.148 
(0.365) 
0.268 
(0.817) 
0.893a 
(2.792) 
-3.313a 
(-6.911) 
1.100b 
(2.436) 
0.151 
(0.160) 
1.618a 
(3.015) 
-0.206 
(-0.960) 
14.211 
(8.037) 
4.4% 
6.497 
0.000 
5265 
Diff2 
(8) 
0.233 
(0.340) 
-0.004 
(-1.246) 
0.001 
(0.193) 
-0.008c 
(-1.841) 
-0.249 
(-0.983) 
0.153 
(0.377) 
0.283 
(0.864) 
0.905a 
(2.830) 
-3.351a 
(-6.980) 
1.094b 
(2.421) 
0.161 
(0.170) 
1.620a 
(3.010) 
-0.159 
(-0.743) 
13.024 
(7.531) 
4.3% 
6.347 
0.000 
5265 
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Table 10 
Robustness Check for the Relation between Product Market Competition and 
Cumulative Abnormal Return 
The sample consists of 5265 completed U.S. merger and acquisitions (listed in SDC) between 1986 and 
2006 made by public U.S. firms. The dependent variable is the bidder's 5-day (-2,+2) cumulate abnormal 
return in percentage points. Variable definitions are in the Table 4. All dollar items are CPI-adjusted to 
year-2006 dollars to adjust for the effect of inflation. In parentheses are t-statistics based on standard errors 
adjusted for heteroskedasticity (White(1980)) .a , b ,c stand for statistical significance based on two-sided 
test at 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. All regressions control for year fixed effects, whose coefficient 
estimates are suppressed. 
Diffl Diff2 
Variable 
Product Market Competition: 
Diff 
Log Market Size(MKTSIZE) 
Log Entry Cost (ENTCOST) 
Concentration ratio(CONC) 
Diff x Dominant 
Log Market Size(MKTSIZE) x Dominant 
Log Entry Cost (ENTCOST) x Dominant 
Bidder Characteristics: 
Dominant 
Log Total assets 
Tobin's Q 
Leverage 
Free Cash Flow (FCF) 
(1) 
-2.746b 
(-2.066) 
-0.223c 
(-1.781) 
0.237b 
(2.103) 
1.408b 
(1.670) 
-0.3273 
(-3.640) 
-0.085c 
(-1.650) 
-0.020c 
(-1.690) 
-0.654 
(-0.440) 
(2) 
-2.760b 
(-2.020) 
-0.227c 
(-1.782) 
0.266b 
(2.261) 
1.361 
(1.592) 
1.402 
(0.329) 
0.230 
(0.756) 
-0.354 
(-1.150) 
-0.683 
(-0.125) 
-0.339a 
(-3.619) 
-0.086c 
(-1.669) 
-0.020c 
(-1.681) 
-0.647 
(-0.434) 
(3) 
-1.527 
-1.519 
-0.151 
-1.126 
0.126 
0.953 
2.064a 
2.563 
-0.3323 
-3.683 
-0.085c 
-1.649 
-0.020c 
-1.711 
-0.650 
-0.437 
(4) 
-1.404 
-1.357 
-0.167 
-1.215 
0.165 
1.187 
1.990a 
2.437 
-1.479 
-0.366 
0.321 
0.948 
-0.415 
-1.046 
1.965 
0.397 
-0.3433 
-3.637 
-0.086c 
-1.666 
-0.020 
-1.703 
-0.638c 
-0.428 
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Table 10-Continued 
Diffl Diff2 
Variable 
Liquidity 
Stock price runup 
CEO equity ownership 
Block 
Deal Characteristics: 
High tech 
Public target x all cash deal 
Private target x all cash deal 
Subsidiary target x all cash deal 
Public target x all stock deal 
Private target x all stock deal 
Subsidiary target x all stock deal 
Relative deal size 
Diversifying acquisition 
Intercept 
Adjust ed-R 
F-statistic 
P-value 
Number of obs. 
(1) 
0.384 
(0.467) 
-0.014a 
(-3.678) 
-0.003 
(0.133) 
-0.014b 
(-2.443) 
-0.055 
(-0.164) 
0.427 
(0.834) 
0.802b 
(1.996) 
1.059 a 
(2.700) 
-3.0963 
(-5.243) 
1.861a 
(3.059) 
-0.573 
(-0.524) 
1.834a 
(3.529) 
-0.370 
(-1.311) 
21.198a 
(8.700) 
3.9% 
6.261 
0.000 
5265 
(2) 
0.371 
(0.451) 
-0.014a 
(-3.678) 
-0.002 
(-0.650) 
-0.014b 
(-2.446) 
-0.041 
(-0.123) 
0.432 
(0.843) 
0.795b 
(1.980) 
1.059a 
(2.700) 
-3.099a 
(-5.246) 
1.863a 
(3.061) 
-0.577 
(-0.527) 
1.837a 
(3.536) 
-0.359 
(-1.272) 
21.0843 
(8.554) 
3.9% 
5.728 
0.000 
5265 
(3) 
0.477 
0.585 
-0.014a 
-3.729 
-0.002 
-0.586 
-0.014b 
-2.424 
0.047 
0.135 
0.421 
0.821 
0.810b 
2.016 
1.073a 
2.740 
-3.123a 
-5.282 
1.849a 
3.033 
-0.571 
-0.523 
1.836a 
3.527 
-0.336 
-1.190 
19.549a 
9.721 
3.9% 
6.187 
' 0.000 
5265 
(4) 
0.468 
0.574 
-0.014a 
-3.733 
-0.002 
-0.564 
-0.014c 
-2.423 
0.051 
0.146 
0.420 
0.818 
0.805b 
2.005 
1.069a 
2.726 
-3.130a 
-5.289 
1.848a 
3.028 
-0.583 
-0.533 
1.837a 
3.528 
-0.324 
-1.147 
19.356a 
9.388 
3.8% 
5.662 
0.000 
5265 
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Table 11 
Logit Regression Explaining Bidder's choice of Diversifying Acquisition Vs. Non-
Diversifying Acquisition Decision in Mergers and Acquisitions Deal. 
The sample consists of 5265 completed U.S. merger and acquisitions (listed in SDC) between 1986 and 
2006 made by public U.S. firms. The dependent variable , Diversifying Acquisition, is Dummy variable 
which takes a value of 1 if bidder and target do not share the same SIC code at four-digit level, 0 otherwise. 
Variable definitions are in the Table 4. All dollar items are CPI-adjusted to year-2006 dollars to adjust for 
the effect of inflation. In parentheses are z-statistics.a, b ,c stand for statistical significance based on 
two-sided test at 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. All regressions control for year fixed effects, whose 
coefficient estimates are suppressed. 
Variable 
Diffl 
(1) (2) (3) 
Diff2 
(4) 
Product Market Competition: 
Diff 
Log Market Size(MKTSIZE) 
Log Entry Cost (ENTCOST) 
Concentration ratio(CONC) 
Bidder Characteristics: 
Dominant 
Log Total assets 
Tobin's Q 
Leverage 
Free Cash Flow (FCF) 
Liquidity 
0.136c 
(1.839) 
0.013 
(0.987) 
-0.01 lb 
(-2.195) 
-0.004 
(-1.490) 
0.395a 
(3.013) 
0.246b 
(2.540) 
2.158a 
(14.155) 
-0.188 
(-1.469) 
0.060a 
(2.757) 
-0.010 
(-1.145) 
-0.009c 
(-1.820) 
0.167 
(0.763) 
0.367b 
(2.289) 
-1.5073 
(-5.114) 
-0.205a 
(-5.915) 
0.086a 
(3.127) 
1.117a 
(5.508) 
-0.244c 
(-1.856) 
0.078a 
(3.436) 
-0.009 
(-1.061) 
-0.009c 
(-1.897) 
0.195 
(0.875) 
0.401b 
(2.475) 
-0.659a 
(-2.735) 
-0.180a 
(-4.891) 
0.039 
(1.209) 
1.457a 
(7.349) 
-0.256b 
(-1.944) 
0.077a 
(3.412) 
-0.010 
(-1.116) 
-0.009c 
(-1.900) 
0.193 
(0.867)' 
0.446a 
(2.758) 
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Tablell-Continued 
Diffl Diff2 
Variable 
Stock price runup 
CEO equity ownership 
Block 
Deal Characteristics: 
High tech 
Public target x all cash deal 
Private target x all cash deal 
Subsidiary target x all cash deal 
Public target x all stock deal 
Private target x all stock deal 
Subsidiary target x all stock deal 
Relative deal size 
Intercept 
McFadden-R2 
Number of obs. 
CD 
0.000 
(0.500 ) 
-0.001 
(-1.312) 
-0.001 
(-1.302) 
-0.052 
(-1.229) 
0.214b 
(2.339) 
0.176a 
(3.216) 
0.103c 
(1.898) 
0.040 
(0.547) 
0.182b 
(2.797) 
0.143 
(1.048) 
-0.127a 
(-2.745) 
-6.171 
(-0.001) 
1.3% 
5265 
(2) 
0.000 
(0.148) 
-0.002 
(-1.097) 
-0.003b 
(-1.996) 
0.186a 
(2.577) 
0.284c 
(1.843) 
0.250a 
(2.748) 
0.137 
(1.521) 
0.075 
(0.623) 
0.257b 
(2.366) 
0.101 
(0.442) 
-0.208a 
(-2.708) 
-21.356 
(-0.001) 
4.3% 
5265 
(3) 
0.000 
(0.347) 
-0.002 
(-1.246) 
-0.002c 
(-1.765) 
0.264a 
(3.543) 
0.316b 
(2.033) 
0.238a 
(2.600) 
0.110 
(1.214) 
0.119 
(0.972) 
0.285a 
(2.607) 
0.102 
(0.444) 
-0.223a 
(-2.905) 
-17.862 
(-0.001) 
5.4% 
5265 
(4) 
0.000 
(0.222) 
-0.002 
(-1.142) 
-0.002c 
(-1.767) 
0.310a 
(4.133) 
0.307b 
(1.983) 
0.242a 
(2.644) 
0.120 
(1.322) 
0.102 
(0.843) 
0.277a 
(2.539) 
0.102 
(0.444) 
-0.221a 
(-2.874) 
-18.846 
(-0.001) 
5.1% 
5265 
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Table 12 
Logit Regression Explaining Bidder's choice of Diversifying Acquisition Vs. Non-
Diversifying Acquisition Decision in Mergers and Acquisitions Deal (without 
CONC) 
The sample consists of 5265 completed U.S. merger and acquisitions (listed in SDC) between 1986 and 
2006 made by public U.S. firms. The dependent variable , Diversifying Acquisition, is Dummy variable 
which takes a value of 1 if bidder and target do not share the same SIC code at four-digit level, 0 otherwise. 
Variable definitions are in the Table 4. All dollar items are CPI-adjusted to year-2006 dollars to adjust for 
the effect of inflation. In parentheses are z-statistics.a, , c stand for statistical significance based on 
two-sided test at 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. All regressions control for year fixed effects, whose 
coefficient estimates are suppressed. 
Diffl 
Variable (D (2) (3) (4) 
Product Market Competition: 
Diff 
Log Market Size(MKTSIZE) 
Log Entry Cost (ENTCOST) 
Bidder Characteristics: 
Dominant 
Log Total assets 
Tobin's Q 
Leverage 
Free Cash Flow (FCF) 
Liquidity 
(continued) 
-0.261a 
(-12.623) 
-0.0973 
(-5.199) 
-0.215c 
(-1.657) 
0.098a 
(4.445) 
-0.014° 
(-1.670) 
-0.009c 
(-1.742) 
0.288 
(1.315) 
0.432a 
(2.698) 
0.062 
(0.492) 
0.047b 
(2.189) 
-0.017b 
(-2.014) 
-0.007 
(-1.462) 
0.509b 
(2.355) 
0.364b 
(2.296) 
-2.780a -1.9423 
(-9.730) (-6,646) 
-0.314a 
(-10.854) 
0.122a 
(4.588) 
0.143 -0.163 
(1.152) (-1.251) 
0.018 0.078a 
(0.841) (3.500) 
-0.014 -0.012 
(-1.625) (-1.344) 
-0.007 -0.009c 
(-1.517) (-1.830) 
0.568a 0.332 
(2.606) (1.494) 
0.325b 0.434a 
(2.036) (2.681) 
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Table 12-Continued 
Diffl 
Variable 
Stock price runup 
CEO equity ownership 
Block 
Deal Characteristics: 
High tech 
Public target x all cash deal 
Private target x all cash deal 
Subsidiary target x all cash deal 
Public target x all stock deal 
Private target x all stock deal 
Subsidiary target x all stock deal 
Relative deal size 
Intercept 
McFadden-R2 
Number of obs. 
(1) 
0.000 
(0.604) 
-0.002 
(-1.408) 
-0.003b 
(-2.102) 
0.184a 
(2.536) 
0.304b 
(1.992) 
0.243a 
(2.682) 
0.150c 
(1.671) 
0.090 
(0.748) 
0.285a 
(2.633) 
0.181 
(0.797) 
-0.200a 
(-2.623) 
-18.109 
(-0.001) 
3.8% 
5265 
(2) 
0.000 
(0.765) 
-0.002 
(-1.431) 
-0.002c 
(-1.768) 
-0.049 
(-0.713) 
0.324b 
(2.149) 
0.273a 
(3.054) 
0.176b 
(1.991) 
0.071 
(0.596) 
0.282a 
(2.642) 
0.246 
(1.095) 
-0.194a 
(-2.563) 
-19.799 
(-0.001) 
1.7% 
5265 
(3) 
0.000 
(0.651) 
-0.002 
(-1.442) 
-0.001 
(-1.134) 
-0.039 
(-0.559) 
0.369b 
(2.422) 
0.270a 
(3.001) 
0.131 
(1.464) 
0.119 
(0.993) 
0.302a 
(2.804) 
0.211 
(0.933) 
-0.2273 
(-2.973) 
-17.249 
(-0.001) 
2.8% 
5265 
(4) 
0.000 
(0.471) 
-0.002 
(-1.364) 
-0.002 
(-1.546) 
0.232a 
(3.134) 
0.342b 
(2.216) 
0.243a 
(2.654) 
0.111 
(1.222) 
0.129 
(1.064) 
0.307a 
(2.814) 
0.142 
(0.619) 
-0.2283 
(-2.966) 
-16.411 
(-0.001) 
4.6% 
5265 
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Table 12-Continued 
Diff2 
Variable (5) 
-0.5513 
(-2.797) 
0.256b 
(2.074) 
0.010 
(0.475) 
-0.018b 
(-2.146) 
-0.0073 
(-1.459) 
0.694a 
(3.205) 
0.432 
(2.722) 
(6) 
-0.374 
(-1.569) 
-0.3453 
(-11.583) 
0.110a 
(3.531) 
-0.152 
(-1.162) 
0.085a 
(3.819) 
-0.014 
(-1.648) 
-0.009c 
(-1.808) 
0.360 
(1.632) 
0.499a 
(3.102) 
Product Market Competition: 
Diff 
Log Market Size(MKTSIZE) 
Log Entry Cost (ENTCOST) 
Bidder Characteristics: 
Dominant 
Log Total assets 
Tobin's Q 
Leverage 
Free Cash Flow (FCF) 
Liquidity 
(continued) 
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Table 12-Continued 
Diff2 
Variable 
Stock price runup 
CEO equity ownership 
Block 
Deal Characteristics: 
High tech 
Public target x all cash deal 
Private target x all cash deal 
Subsidiary target x all cash deal 
Public target x all stock deal 
Private target x all stock deal 
Subsidiary target x all stock deal 
Relative deal size 
Intercept 
McFadden-R2 
Number of obs. 
(5) 
0.000 
(0.483) 
-0.002 
(-1.252) 
-0.001 
(-1.027) 
-0.048 
(-0.688) 
0.370a 
(2.451) 
0.289a 
(3.249) 
0.160c 
(1.805) 
0.077 
(0.646) 
0.3053 
(2.861) 
0.231 
(1.032) 
-0.2163 
(-2.850) 
-19.933 
(-0.001) 
1.4% 
5265 
(6) 
0.000 
(0.375) 
-0.002 
(-1.268) 
-0.002 
(-1.620) 
0.256a 
(3.439) 
0.329b 
(2.147) 
0.248a 
(2.730) 
0.129 
(1.427) 
0.104 
(0.860) 
0.303a 
(2.794) 
0.153 
(0.670) 
-0.219a 
(-2.865) 
-17.668 
(-0.001) 
4.3% 
5265 
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Table 13 
The Relation between Product Market Competition and Corporate Mergers 
Premiums 
The sample consists of 750 completed U.S. merger and acquisitions (listed in SDC) between 1986 and 
2006 made by public U.S. firms. The dependent variable is the merger premium which is defined as 
four-week pre-announcement premium. It equals the difference between the initial bid price and the target 
price four weeks prior to the announcement. Variable definitions are in the Table 4. All dollar items are 
CPI-adjusted to year-2006 dollars to adjust for the effect of inflation. In parentheses are t-statistics based on 
standard errors adjusted for heteroskedasticity (White(1980)).a, b,c stand for statistical significance based 
on two-sided test at 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. All regressions control for year fixed effects, 
whose coefficient estimates are suppressed. 
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Product Market Competition: 
Diff 
Log Market Size(MKTSIZE) 
Log Entry Cost (ENTCOST) 
Concentration ratio(CONC) 7.643 
(1.121) 
Diff x Dominant 
Log Market Size(MKTSIZE) x 
Dominant 
Log Entry Cost (ENTCOST) x 
Dominant 
Bidder Characteristics: 
Dominant 
Tobin's QA 
LeverageA 
Free Cash Flow (FCF)
 A 
4.359 
(0.760) 
1.925a 
(2.745) 
-0.048 
(-1.392) 
-15.201 
(-1.220) 
3.081 
(0.521) 
1.960a 
(2.814) 
-0.057 
(-1.462) 
-16.422 
(-1.326) 
(continued) 
0.015 
(0.016) 
7.722 
(0.878) 
0.948 
(0.876) 
9.501 
(1.304) 
3.082 
(0.522) 
1.961a 
(2.809) 
-0.057 
(-1.459) 
-16.421 
(-1.326) 
3.518 
(0.604) 
1.959a 
(2.844) 
-0.055 
(-1.385) 
-15.136 
(-1.222) 
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Table 13 
Variable 
LiquidityA 
Target Characteristics: 
Tobin's QT 
Leverager 
Free Cash Flow (FCF)
 T 
Liquidity! 
Deal Characteristics: 
Relative firm sizeA/r 
Relative deal size 
Diversifying acquisition 
all cash deal 
all stock deal 
Intercept 
Adjusted-R 
F-statistic 
P-value 
Number of obs. 
Continued 
(1) 
4.586 
(0.507) 
-2.189b 
(-2.449) 
0.031c 
(1.952) 
0.026 
(0.003) 
8.841 
(1.043) 
9.378a 
(2.798) 
0.486 
(0.187) 
-5.040c 
(-1.674) 
1.804 
(0.400) 
-1.213 
(-0.305) 
4.673 
(0.350) 
5.3% 
2.299 
0.000 
750 
(2) 
4.165 
(0.460) 
-2.137b 
(-2.422) 
0.033b 
(2.101) 
-0.334 
(-0.039) 
8.692 
(1.027) 
9.681a 
(2.891) 
0.446 
(0.171) 
-5.747° 
(-1.878) 
1.254 
(0.274) 
-1.276 
(-0.320) 
-1.161 
(-0.082) 
5.3% 
2.266 
0.000 
750 
(3) 
4.165 
(0.459) 
-2.138b 
(-2.429) 
0.033b 
(2.102) 
-0.341 
(-0.040) 
8.693 
(1.026) 
9.678a 
(2.878) 
0.447 
(0.171) 
-5.744c 
(-1.878) 
1.256 
(0.275) 
-1.274 
(-0.320) 
-1.364 
(-0.073) 
5.2% 
2.197 
0.000 
750 
(4) 
4.935 
(0.548) 
-2.245b 
(-2.505) 
0.031b 
(1.985) 
-0.844 
(-0.099) 
9.724 
(1.142) 
9.340a 
(2.791) 
0.404 
(0.155) 
-5.672c 
(-1.859) 
1.486 
(0.323) 
-1.230 
(-0.308) 
-10.051 
(-0.569) 
5.3% 
2.229 
0.000 
750 
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Table 13-Countined 
Diffl Diff2 
Variable 
Product Market Competition: 
Diff 
Log Market Size(MKTSIZE) 
Log Entry Cost (ENTCOST) 
Concentration ratio(CONC) 
Diff x Dominant 
Log Market Size(MKTSIZE) x 
Dominant 
Log Entry Cost (ENTCOST) x 
Dominant 
Bidder Characteristics: 
Dominant 
Tobin's QA 
LeverageA 
Free Cash Flow (FCF) A 
(5) 
12.499 
(0.973) 
9.749 
(1.358) 
2.993 
(0.503) 
1.974a 
(2.833) 
-0.056 
(-1.423) 
-17.057 
(-1.385) 
(6) 
11.523 
(0.871) 
-0.962 
(-0.802) 
1.469 
(1.106) 
7.522 
(0.800) 
3.618 
(0.615) 
1.944a 
(2.841) 
-0.056 
(-1.383) 
-15.079 
(-1.209) 
(7) 
3.214 
(0.366) 
7.358 
(1.060) 
-
2.952 
(0.498) 
1.958a 
(2.795) 
-0.058 
(-1.439) 
-16.911 
(-1.375) 
(8) 
15.664 
(1.393) 
-1.811 
(-1.424) 
2.735 
(1.594) 
2.307 
(0.259) 
3.600 
(0.608) 
1.893a 
(2.751) 
-0.060 
(-1.288) 
-15.215 
(-1.228) 
(continued) 
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Table 13-Continued 
Diffl DifO 
Variable 
LiquidityA 
Target Characteristics: 
Tobin's QT 
Leveragex 
Free Cash Flow (FCF) x 
Liquidity! 
Deal Characteristics: 
Relative firm sizeA/T 
Relative deal size 
Diversifying acquisition 
all cash deal 
all stock deal 
Intercept 
Adjusted-R 
F-statistic 
P-value 
Number of obs. 
(5) 
4.250 
(0.470) 
-2.171b 
(-2.446) 
0.032b 
(2.028) 
-0.428 
(-0.050) 
8.560 
(1.012) 
9.416a 
(2.815) 
0.254 
(0.096) 
-5.491c 
(-1.783) 
1.297 
(0.283) 
-1.509 
(-0.378) 
-16.141 
(-0.788) 
5.3% 
2.224 
0.000 
750 
(6) 
5.447 
(0.602) 
-2.256a 
(-2.499) 
0.030c 
(1.885) 
-0.748 
(-0.088) 
10.139 
(1.188) 
9.127a 
(2.724) 
0.179 
(0.068) 
-5.579c 
(-1.813) 
1.545 
(0.335) 
-1.532 
(-0.383) 
-15.959 
(-0.606) 
5.2% 
2.138 
0.000 
750 
(7) 
3.691 
(0.405) 
-2.129b 
(-2.403) 
0.032c 
(1.998) 
-0.267 
(-0.031) 
8.138 
(0.944) 
9.667a 
(2.882) 
0.448 
(0.171) 
-5.678c 
(-1.846) 
1.198 
(0.261) 
-1.366 
(-0.341) 
-3.207 
(-0.220) 
5.2% 
2.201 
0.000 
750 
(8) 
4.097 
(0.452) 
-2.258a 
(-2.479) 
0.024 
(1.496) 
-0.611 
(-0.072) 
8.909 
(1.035) 
9.040a 
(2.689) 
0.288 
(0.110) 
-5.544c 
(-1.811) 
1.445 
(0.314) 
-1.797 
(-0.451) 
-12.711 
(-0.609) 
5.3% 
2.172 
0.000 
750 
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Table 14 
The Relation between Product Market Competition and Corporate Mergers 
Premiums (with interactions between PMC variables and Dominant) 
The sample consists of 750 completed U.S. merger and acquisitions (listed in SDC) between 1986 and 
2006 made by public U.S. firms. The dependent variable is the merger premium which is defined as 
four-week pre-announcement premium. It equals the difference between the initial bid price and the target 
price four weeks prior to the announcement. Variable definitions are in the Table 4. All dollar items are 
CPI-adjusted to year-2006 dollars to adjust for the effect of inflation. In parentheses are t-statistics based on 
standard errors adjusted for heteroskedasticity (White(1980)).a, b ,c stand for statistical significance based 
on two-sided test at 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. All regressions control for year fixed effects, 
whose coefficient estimates are suppressed. 
Diffl 
Variable 
Product Market Competition: 
Diff 
Log Market Size(MKTSIZE) 
Log Entry Cost (ENTCOST) 
Concentration ratio(CONC) 
Diff x Dominant 
Log Market Size(MKTSIZE) x 
Dominant 
Log Entry Cost (ENTCOST) x 
Dominant 
Bidder Characteristics: 
Dominant 
Tobin's QA 
LeverageA 
Free Cash Flow (FCF)
 A 
(1) 
0.321 
(0.340) 
7.692 
(0.875) 
-4.928 
(-1.035) 
50.175 
(1.053) 
1.993a 
(2.863) 
-0.055 
(-1.450) 
-15.708 
(-1.270) 
(2) 
1.685 
(1.622) 
10.164 
(1.389) 
-11.777° 
(-1.946) 
95.953c 
(1.919) 
1.921a 
(2.799) 
-0.051 
(-1.310) 
-13.734 
(-1.110) 
(3) 
19.709 
(1.562) 
10.552 
(1.464) 
-87.571 
(-1.427) 
104.067 
(1.419) 
1.940a 
(2.752) 
-0.055 
(-1.380) 
-15.916 
(-1.290) 
(4) 
19.153 
(1.483) 
-0.992 
(-0.823) 
2.275c 
(1.729) 
10.242 
(1.094) 
-45.841 
(-0.935) 
3.430 
(0.830) 
-13.364b 
(-2.125) 
128.618 
(1.554) 
1.870a 
(2.717) 
-0.051 
(-1.265) 
-13.612 
(-1.092) 
(continued) 
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Table 14-Continued 
Diffl 
Variable 
LiquidityA 
Target Characteristics: 
Tobin's QT 
Leveragex 
Free Cash Flow (FCF) x 
Liquidity! 
Deal Characteristics: 
Relative firm sizeA/T 
Relative deal size 
Diversifying acquisition 
all cash deal 
all stock deal 
Intercept 
Adjusted-R 
F-statistic 
P-value 
Number of obs. 
(1) 
3.115 
(0.342) 
-2.185b 
(-2.483) 
0.034b 
(2.218) 
-0.411 
(-0.048) 
10.013 
(1.182) 
9.743a 
(2.892) 
0.310 
(0.122) 
-5.750c 
(-1.878) 
1.263 
(0.277) 
-1.236 
(-0.311) 
-0.974 
(-0.055) 
5.3% 
2.200 
0.000 
750 
(2) 
3.332 
(0.367) 
-2.247a 
(-2.563) 
0.033b 
(2.217) 
-1.401 
(-0.165) 
11.251 
(1.332) 
9.505a 
(2.838) 
-0.044 
(-0.018) 
-5.289c 
(-1.748) 
1.586 
(0.347) 
-0.811 
(-0.203) 
-8.551 
(-0.555) 
6.5% 
2.490 
0.000 
750 
(3) 
4.346 
(0.479) 
-2.155b 
(-2.424) 
0.03 lb 
(2.033) 
-0.667 
(-0.078) 
9.161 
(1.082) 
9.181a 
(2.754) 
0.018 
(0.007) 
-5.304c 
(-1.733) 
1.208 
(0.265) 
-1.867 
(-0.468) 
-26.801 
(-1.228) 
5.6% 
2.259 
0.000 
750 
(4) 
4.410 
(0.483) 
-2.24 la 
(-2.532) 
0.030b 
(2.048) 
-1.557 
(-0.183) 
11.199 
(1.311) 
9.033a 
(2.701) 
-0.411 
(-0.168) 
-4.931 
(-1.612) 
1.633 
(0.356) 
-1.322 
(-0.329) 
-26.872 
(-1.079) 
6.4% 
2.311 
0.000 
750 
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Table 14-Continued 
Diff2 
Variable 
Product Market Competition: 
Diff 
Log Market Size(MKTSIZE) 
Log Entry Cost (ENTCOST) 
Concentration ratio(CONC) 
Diff x Dominant 
Log Market Size(MKTSIZE) x 
Dominant 
Log Entry Cost (ENTCOST) x 
Dominant 
Bidder Characteristics: 
Dominant 
Tobin's QA 
LeverageA 
Free Cash Flow (FCF) A 
(5) 
7.424 
(0.836) 
6.355 
(0.909) 
-95.706a 
(-2.664) 
96.973a 
(2.648) 
1.947a 
(2.764) 
-0.058 
(-1.390) 
-16.555 
(-1.346) 
(6) 
30.970a 
(2.893) 
-2.730b 
(-2.108) 
4.799a 
(2.889) 
0.293 
(0.033) 
-143.3713 
(1.666) 
6 819c 
u . u i y 
(1.666) 
-18.894a 
(-2.879) 
227.593a 
(3.024) 
1.749a 
(2.507) 
-0.059 
(-1.091) 
-13.625 
(-1.101) 
(continued) 
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Table 14-Continued 
Diff2 
Variable 
LiquidityA 
Target Characteristics: 
Tobin's QT 
Leveragex 
Free Cash Flow (FCF) T 
Liquidityi 
Deal Characteristics: 
Relative firm sizeA/T 
Relative deal size 
Diversifying acquisition 
all cash deal 
all stock deal 
Intercept 
Adjusted-R 
F-statistic 
P-value 
Number of obs. 
(5) 
3.464 
(0.381) 
-2.091b 
(-2.356) 
0.031b 
(1.948) 
-0.041 
(-0.005) 
7.825 
(0.911) 
9.596a 
(2.873) 
0.229 
(0.088) 
-5.637c 
(-1.840) 
0.529 
(0.115) 
-1.882 
(-0.470) 
-13.367 
(-0.713) 
5.6% 
2.276 
0.000 
750 
(6) 
2.033 
(0.224) 
-2.177b 
(-2.435) 
0.020 
(1.295) 
-1.119 
(-0.132) 
8.454 
(0.985) 
8.865a 
(2.666) 
-0.617 
(-0.257) 
-4.692 
(-1.554) 
0.597 
(0.131) 
-2.218 
(-0.560) 
-33.480 
(-1.531) 
7.8% 
2.621 
0.000 
750 
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Table 15 
The Relation between Product Market Competition and Corporate Mergers 
Premiums (without CONC and interactions between PMC variables and Dominant) 
The sample consists of 750 completed U.S. merger and acquisitions (listed in SDC) between 1986 and 
2006 made by public U.S. firms. The dependent variable is the merger premium which is defined as 
four-week pre-announcement premium. It equals the difference between the initial bid price and the target 
price four weeks prior to the announcement. Variable definitions are in the Table 4. All dollar items are 
CPI-adjusted to year-2006 dollars to adjust for the effect of inflation. In parentheses are t-statistics based on 
standard errors adjusted for heteroskedasticity (White(1980)).a, b ,c stand for statistical significance based 
on two-sided test at 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. All regressions control for year fixed effects, 
whose coefficient estimates are suppressed. 
Diffl 
Variable 
Product Market Competition: 
Diff 
Log Market Size(MKTSIZE) 
Log Entry Cost (ENTCOST) 
(1) 
-0.571 
(-0.751) 
(2) 
0.621 
(0.605) 
(3) 
6.755 
(0.531) 
(4) 
8.330 
(0.661) 
-1.631 
(-1.635) 
1.690 
(1.268) 
Concentration ratio(CONC) 
Diff x Dominant 
Log Market Size(MKTSIZE) x 
Dominant 
Log Entry Cost (ENTCOST) x 
Dominant 
Bidder Characteristics: 
Dominant 
Tobin's QA 
LeverageA 
Free Cash Flow (FCF) A 
3.833 
(0.677) 
1.923a 
(2.755) 
-0.053 
(-1.459) 
-15.708 
(-1.259) 
4.849 
(0.866) 
1.918a 
(2.750) 
-0.046 
(-1.308) 
-14.164 
(-1.134) 
4.501 
(0.787) 
1.927a 
(2.740) 
-0.047 
(-1.337) 
-15.363 
(-1.235) 
4.367 
(0.774) 
1.903a 
(2.789) 
-0.053 
(-1.381) 
-14.024 
(-1.115) 
(continued) 
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Table 15-Continued 
Diffl 
Variable 
LiquidityA 
Target Characteristics: 
Tobin's QT 
Leverage! 
Free Cash Flow (FCF) x 
Liquidity! 
Deal Characteristics: 
Relative firm sizeA/T 
Relative deal size 
Diversifying acquisition 
all cash deal 
all stock deal 
Intercept 
Adjusted-R 
F-statistic 
P-value 
Number of obs. 
(1) 
4.431 
(0.489) 
-2.122b 
(-2.393) 
0.032b 
(2.043) 
0.164 
(0.019) 
8.766 
(1.032) 
9.625a 
(2.855) 
0.456 
(0.175) 
-5.420c 
(-1.788) 
1.528 
(0.338) 
-1.304 
(-0.327) 
10.028 
(0.691) 
5.2% 
2.242 
0.000 
750 
(2) 
5.158 
(0.572) 
-2.267a 
(-2.499) 
0.030c 
(1.875) 
-0.251 
(-0.029) 
9.541 
(1.118) 
9.106a 
(2.709) 
0.465 
(0.179) 
-4.879 
(-1.623) 
2.043 
(0.447) 
-1.173 
(-0.294) 
-0.225 
-(0.014) 
5.2% 
2.241 
0.000 
750 
(3) 
4.695 
(0.519) 
-2.2153 
(-2.468) 
0.030c 
(1.902) 
0.029 
(0.003) 
8.792 
(1.037) 
9.189a 
(2.732) 
0.388 
(0.148) 
-4.797 
(-1.568) 
1.909 
(0.422) 
-1.329 
(-0.335) 
-2.554 
(-0.135) 
5.2% 
2.235 
0.000 
750 
(4) 
5.833 
(0.646) 
-2.245a 
(-2.472) 
0.029c 
(1.826) 
-0.333 
(-0.039) 
10.470 
(1.224) 
9.109a 
(2.711) 
0.222 
(0.085) 
-5.387c 
(-1.753) 
1.799 
(0.395) 
-1.508 
(-0.378) 
-2.277 
(-0.112) 
5.2% 
2.183 
0.000 
750 
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Table 15-Continued 
Diff2 
Variable (5) (6J 
Product Market Competition: 
Diff 
Log Market Size(MKTSIZE) 
Log Entry Cost (ENTCOST) 
Concentration ratio(CONC) 
Diff x Dominant 
Log Market Size(MKTSIZE) x 
Dominant 
Log Entry Cost (ENTCOST) x 
Dominant 
Bidder Characteristics: 
Dominant 
Tobin's QA 
LeverageA 
Free Cash Flow (FCF)
 A 
4.381 16.309 
(0.507) (1.485) 
-2.046b 
(-1.942) 
2.849c 
(1.695) 
4.117 
(0.712) 
1.923a 
(2.730) 
-0.050 
(-1.363) 
-15.930 
(-1.289) 
3.825 
(0.661) 
1.880a 
(2.760) 
-0.059 
(-1.287) 
-14.971 
(-1.209) 
(continued) 
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Table 15-Continued 
Diff2 
Variable 
LiquidityA 
Target Characteristics: 
Tobin's QT 
Leveragej 
Free Cash Flow (FCF) T 
Liquidityj 
Deal Characteristics: 
Relative firm sizeA/T 
Relative deal size 
Diversifying acquisition 
all cash deal 
all stock deal 
Intercept 
Adjusted-R 
F-statistic 
P-value 
Number of obs. 
(5) 
3.919 
(0.431) 
-2.175b 
(-2.423) 
0.030c 
(1.842) 
0.098 
(0.011) 
8.077 
(0.935) 
9.374a 
(2.794) 
0.487 
(0.187) 
-4.983c 
(-1.650) 
1.699 
(0.374) 
-1.340 
(-0.335) 
1.586 
(0.112) 
5.2% 
2.234 
0.000 
750 
(6) 
4.168 
(0.461) 
-2.259a 
(-2.474) 
0.023 
(1.442) 
-0.487 
(-0.057) 
8.940 
(1.038) 
8.999a 
(2.677) 
0.283 
(0.109) 
-5.449c 
(-1.797) 
1.527 
(0.335) 
-1.826 
(-0.456) 
-10.109 
(-0.529) 
5.5% 
2.236 
0.000 
750 
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Table 16 
The Relation between Product Market Competition and Corporate Mergers 
Premiums (without CONC) 
The sample consists of 750 completed U.S. merger and acquisitions (listed in SDC) between 1986 and 
2006 made by public U.S. firms. The dependent variable is the merger premium which is defined as 
four-week pre-announcement premium. It equals the difference between the initial bid price and the target 
price four weeks prior to the announcement. Variable definitions are in the Table 4. All dollar items are 
CPI-adjusted to year-2006 dollars to adjust for the effect of inflation. In parentheses are t-statistics based on 
standard errors adjusted for heteroskedasticity (White(1980)).a, b ,c stand for statistical significance based 
on two-sided test at 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. All regressions control for year fixed effects, 
whose coefficient estimates are suppressed. 
Diffl 
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Product Market Competition: 
Diff 
Log Market Size(MKTSIZE) 
Log Entry Cost (ENTCOST) 
Concentration ratio(CONC) 
Diff x Dominant 
Log Market Size(MKTSIZE) x 
Dominant 
Log Entry Cost (ENTCOST) x 
Dominant 
Bidder Characteristics: 
Dominant 
Tobin's QA 
LeverageA 
Free Cash Flow (FCF) A 
(continued) 
-0.262 
(-0.356) 
1.327c 
(1.354) 
-4.934 
(-1.043) 
50.984 
(1.078) 
1.956a 
(2.809) 
-0.051 
(-1.451) 
-14.997 
(-1.204) 
-11.629c 
(-1.925) 
96.217c 
(1.924) 
1.878a 
(2.696) 
-0.041 
(-1.213) 
-12.713 
(-1.019) 
13.166 14.607 
(1.051) (1.164) 
-1.883c 
(-1.827) 
2.548c 
(1.929) 
-83.330 -44.862 
(-1.368) (-0.917) 
3.113 
(0.765) 
-12.910b 
(-2.065) 
100.799 127.960 
(1.380) (1.549) 
1.891a 1.819a 
(2.651) (2.635) 
-0.045 -0.047 
(-1.283) (-1.255) 
-14.144 -12.199 
(-1.133) (-0.967) 
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Table 16 
Variable 
LiquidityA 
Target Characteristics: 
Tobin's QT 
Leveragej 
Free Cash Flow (FCF) T 
Liquidity! 
Deal Characteristics: 
Relative firm sizeA/T 
Relative deal size 
Diversifying acquisition 
all cash deal 
all stock deal 
Intercept 
Adjusted-R 
F-statistic 
P-value 
Number of obs. 
Continued 
Diffl 
(1) 
3.379 
(0.371) 
-2.169b 
(-2.447) 
0.033b 
(2.156) 
0.092 
(0.011) 
10.088 
(1.188) 
9.689a 
(2.869) 
0.319 
(0.126) 
-5.428c 
(-1.789) 
1.535 
(0.339) 
-1.266 
(-0.318) 
10.374 
(0.767) 
5.3% 
2.244 
0.000 
750 
(2) 
3.591 
(0.396) 
-2.2713 
(-2.555) 
0.031b 
(2.086) 
-0.760 
(-0.089) 
11.036 
(1.302) 
9.252a 
(2.749) 
0.027 
(0.011) 
-4.446 
(-1.494) 
2.181 
(0.480) 
-0.755 
(-0.189) 
1.933 
(0.144) 
6.4% 
2.501 
0.000 
750 
(3) 
4.822 
(0.531) 
-2.202b 
(-2.449) 
0.030c 
(1.894) 
-0.164 
(-0.019) 
9.382 
(1.105) 
8.948a 
(2.667) 
0.174 
(0.068) 
-4.565 
(-1.503) 
1.872 
(0.414) 
-1.656 
(-0.418) 
-11.634 
(-0.573) 
5.4% 
2.262 
0.000 
750 
(4) 
4.925 
(0.539) 
-2.227a 
(-2.494) 
0.029b 
(1.960) 
-0.975 
(-0.114) 
11.670 
(1.363) 
9.014a 
(2.685) 
-0.340 
(-0.140) 
-4.693 
(-1.535) 
1.973 
(0.434) 
-1.297 
(-0.323) 
-8.067 
(-0.420) 
6.4% 
2.342 
0.000 
750 
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Table 16-Continued 
Diff2 
Variable (5) 
8.549 
(0.983) 
-98.446a 
(-2.785) 
100.6673 
(2.795) 
1.917a 
(2.712) 
-0.052 
(-1.327) 
-15.701 
(-1.271) 
(6) 
31.0593 
(2.972) 
-2.760a 
(-2.559) 
4.813a 
(2.949) 
-143.511a 
(-3.648) 
6.818c 
(1.668) 
-18.8933 
(-2.881) 
227.755a 
(3.030) 
1.747a 
(2.537) 
-0.059 
(-1.096) 
-13.593 
(-1.101) 
Product Market Competition: 
Diff 
Log Market Size(MKTSIZE) 
Log Entry Cost (ENTCOST) 
Concentration ratio(CONC) 
Diff x Dominant 
Log Market Size(MKTSIZE) x 
Dominant 
Log Entry Cost (ENTCOST) x 
Dominant 
Bidder Characteristics: 
Dominant 
Tobin's QA 
LeverageA 
Free Cash Flow (FCF)
 A 
(continued) 
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Table 16-Continued 
Diff2 
Variable 
LiquidityA 
Target Characteristics: 
Tobin's Qx 
Leveragej 
Free Cash Flow (FCF) T 
Liquidityx 
Deal Characteristics: 
Relative firm sizeA/x 
Relative deal size 
Diversifying acquisition 
all cash deal 
all stock deal 
Intercept 
Adjusted-R 
F-statistic 
P-value 
Number of obs. 
(5) 
3.653 
(0.403) 
-2.129b 
(-2.372) 
0.029c 
(1.810) 
0.280 
(0.033) 
7.764 
(0.903) 
9.342a 
(2.800) 
0.255 
(0.099) 
-5.038c 
(-1.676) 
0.941 
(0.207) 
-1.874 
(-0.468) 
-9.537 
(-0.512) 
5.7% 
2.320 
0.000 
750 
(6) 
2.042 
(0.226) 
-2.177b 
(-2.436) 
0.019 
(1.277) 
-1.103 
(-0.131) 
8.458 
(0.986) 
8.859a 
(2.665) 
-0.618 
(-0.257) 
-4.680 
(-1.567) 
0.607 
(0.135) 
-2.223 
(-0.558) 
-33.168 
(-1.625) 
7.9% 
2.694 
0.000 
750 
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Table 17 
The Relation between Product Market Competition and Corporate Mergers 
Premiums (without CONC and adding acquirer's CEO equity ownership) 
The sample consists of 750 completed U.S. merger and acquisitions (listed in SDC) between 1986 and 
2006 made by public U.S. firms. The dependent variable is the merger premium which is defined as 
four-week pre-announcement premium. It equals the difference between the initial bid price and the target 
price four weeks prior to the announcement. Variable definitions are in the table 4. All dollar items are 
CPI-adjusted to year-2006 dollars to adjust for the effect of inflation. In parentheses are t-statistics based on 
standard errors adjusted for heteroskedasticity (White(1980)).a, b ,c stand for statistical significance based 
on two-sided test at 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. All regressions control for year fixed effects, 
whose coefficient estimates are suppressed. 
Diffl DifO 
Variable (1) (2) 
Product Market Competition: 
Diff 
Log Market Size(MKTSIZE) 
Log Entry Cost (ENTCOST) 
Diff x Dominant 
Log Market Size(MKTSIZE) x 
Dominant 
Log Entry Cost (ENTCOST) x 
Dominant 
Bidder Characteristics: 
Dominant 
Tobin's QA 
LeverageA 
Free Cash Flow (FCF)
 A 
LiquidityA 
14.593 
(1.163) 
-1.880c 
(-1.822) 
2.528c 
(1.916) 
-44.447 
(-0.907) 
3.143 
(0.771) 
-12.931b 
(-2.066) 
127.311 
(1.536) 
1.818a 
(2.633) 
-0.048 
(-1.259) 
-12.268 
(-0.972) 
5.031 
(0.545) 
31.0573 
(2.971) 
-2.758a 
(-2.557) 
4.804a 
(2.960) 
-143.330a 
(-3.639) 
6.827° 
(1.666) 
-18.894a 
(-2.878) 
227.4703 
(3.017) 
1.747a 
(2.535) 
-0.059 
(-1.097) 
-13.623 
(-1.103) 
2.091 
(0.229) 
(continued) 
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Tablel7-Continued 
Diffl Diff2 
Variable (1) (2) 
CEO equity ownership 
Target Characteristics: 
Tobin's QT 
Leverager 
Free Cash Flow (FCF) T 
Liquidityx 
Deal Characteristics: 
Relative firm sizeA/T 
Relative deal size 
Diversifying acquisition 
all cash deal 
all stock deal 
Intercept 
Adjust ed-R 
F-statistic 
P-value 
Number of obs. 
-0.030 
(-0.188) 
-2.233a 
(-2.495) 
0.029b 
(1.953) 
-0.996 
(-0.117) 
11.632 
(1.358) 
8.997a 
(2.675) 
-0.327 
(-0.134) 
-4.683 
(-1.533) 
1.979 
(0.435) 
-1.292 
(-0.322) 
-7.857 
(-0.412) 
6.2% 
2.279 
0.000 
750 
-0.014 
(-0.088) 
-2.179b 
(-2.434) 
0.019 
(1.273) 
-1.113 
(-0.132) 
8.442 
(0.983) 
8.8518 
(2.658) 
-0.612 
(-0.254) 
-4.676 
(-1.567) 
0.610 
(0.136) 
-2.221 
(-0.557) 
-33.068 
(-1.631) 
7.8% 
2.622 
0.000 
750 
